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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important powers the Constitution granted to 
Congress was the power to “declare war.”1  In over two centuries since 
the Constitution was enacted, this monumental power has only been 
exercised in five conflicts:  the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the 
Spanish-American War, World War I, and World War II.2  On all five 
of these occasions, the President sought a declaration of war from 
Congress, and Congress proceeded to grant the President’s request.3  
However, the concept of “undeclared war” has been in existence 
since before the founding of the nation;4 even in the early 19th cen-
tury, American servicemen found themselves in combat against for-
eign powers without being authorized by a congressional declaration 
of war.5  Nonetheless, questions remain to this day as to when a decla-
 
 * Judicial Clerk to the Honorable W. Royal Furgeson, Jr., United States Senior District 
Judge for the Northern District of Texas; J.D., with honors, Emory University School of 
Law (2010); B.A., cum laude, University of Florida (2007).  My great thanks to Professor 
Hanah Volokh, Professor Charles Shanor, and Professor David Bederman for their inva-
luable guidance in writing this article.  Thanks as well to the American Constitution So-
ciety for Law and Policy for giving me this opportunity, and to the staff of the University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law for their diligence work and comments. 
 1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (“The Congress shall have Power To . . . declare War, grant 
Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Wa-
ter.”). 
 2 Lori Fisler Damrosch, Comment, War and Uncertainty, 114 YALE L.J. 1405, 1408 (2005) 
(discussing the instances where Congress has formally declared war). 
 3 See CHARLES A. STEVENSON, CONGRESS AT WAR:  THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT SINCE 1789 
12–15 (2007). 
 4 See Jeffrey A. Botelho, Congressional Responsibility in Controlling the War Machine, 21 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 305, 316 (2009) (noting that “[t]he Framers were no strangers to undec-
lared wars,” and referring to George Washington’s service with the British military during 
the undeclared French and Indian War against France). 
 5 See infra Part II (discussing the American military expeditions in North Africa fighting the 
Barbary States in the early 19th century). 
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ration of war by Congress is required, when the President may act 
without the approval of Congress, or when some form of congres-
sional approval less than a declaration of war is sufficient. 
This article proposes a framework distinguishing between offen-
sive war, in which the decision should be made by Congress, and de-
fensive war, where the President can act without congressional ap-
proval.  This article ultimately determines that when the United 
States initiates a conflict, Congress should follow the Constitution’s 
instructions and issue a declaration of war, but when a defensive war 
shifts to an offensive character, the President must seek congressional 
authorization that can be short of an actual declaration of war.  This 
framework is based on the early views and practices of the Framers 
for the appropriate role of the President and Congress regarding the 
war-making power, drawing particularly from two of the United 
States’ earliest undeclared wars known as the Barbary Wars.  While 
these intermittent American conflicts with the Barbary States of 
North Africa in the early part of the 19th century are among the less-
er-known conflicts in the history of the United States, the actions of 
the executive and legislative branches in these conflicts can help in-
terpret the Framers’ original understanding of the proper role for 
both Congress and the President in undeclared war.6  Determining 
those proper roles is especially relevant because wars conducted 
without a formal declaration from Congress have become increasing-
ly common over the last sixty years; all five of the major conflicts in 
the post-World War II era7 were not accompanied by a congressional 
declaration of war.8  Regarding the 2003 invasion of Iraq, this article 
argues that the policy of preemptive war promoted by the Bush ad-
ministration is inherently offensive because the United States is the 
nation initiating the conflict.  The adoption of this policy calls for a 
revival of the declaration of war in the limited circumstance of initiat-
 
 6 Many of the Framers and early thinkers of the Republic determined or criticized the na-
tion’s course of action during the Barbary Wars, including, as we shall see, Thomas Jeffer-
son, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and many others. 
 7 Major wars fought by the United States since World War II include the Korean War 
(1950–53), the Vietnam War (1964–1973), the First Gulf War (1991), the War in Afgha-
nistan (2001–present), and the Second Gulf War (2003–present).  STEVENSON, supra note 
3, at 12, 31.  All five of these conflicts are discussed infra in Part IV. 
 8 Smaller-scale American uses of military force since World War II include combat deploy-
ments in Lebanon, Grenada, Panama, Haiti, and elsewhere; these conflicts were also not 
accompanied by a declaration of war.  Id. at 30–31.  Most recently, in March of 2011, the 
United States launched a bombing campaign using air and sea power against government 
forces as part of an international effort in Libya without a declaration of war.  See Libya De-
fiant Under Fire; Waves of Missile, Jet Attacks Batter Gadhafi Sites in Bid to Aid Rebels, CHI. TRIB., 
Mar. 20, 2011, at C19. 
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ing an offensive war to restore Congress to its properly intended role.  
This way, Congress takes the strongest possible action in its arsenal, 
provides an effective check on the President in the crucial decision to 
go to war, and places the policy-making role in terms of the war pow-
er in the hands of Congress, where the early practices of the Framers 
indicated it should be. 
I.  THE WAR-MAKING POWER OF CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 
The Constitution meant to create a system where there was a sepa-
ration of powers between Congress, the President, and the judiciary, 
rather than the significant amount of power concentrated in the ex-
ecutive that governed Great Britain and the colonies before the 
American Revolution.  Establishing checks on the war power was es-
pecially important to the Framers.9  Under the British system, the 
king had near-total control of the deployment and use of the armed 
forces.10  Mindful of that power concentrated in the Crown, many 
delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 were wary of plac-
ing the full extent of war powers in the executive branch.11  As Louis 
Fisher wrote, “Legislative control over the deployment of military 
forces was widely supported by the framers.”12 
The wariness of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention to 
vest the war-making power in the executive showed in their debates 
and discussions over the war power on August 17, 1787.13  When 
Pierce Butler of South Carolina advocated vesting the “war making 
power” in the President, Massachusetts delegate Elbridge Gerry re-
sponded that he “never expected to hear in a Republic a motion to 
empower the Executive alone to declare war.”14  The Constitution 
 
 9 See Alexander M. Bickel, Congress, the President and the Power to Wage War, 48 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 131, 131–32 (1971) (arguing that the Framers’ intent in granting the war power to 
Congress was to make it harder to start wars). 
 10 See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 1 (2d. ed. 2004) (“The power to initiate war 
[in Great Britain] . . . remained a monarchical prerogative.”). 
 11 See EDWARD KEYNES, UNDECLARED WAR:  TWILIGHT ZONE OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 19 
(1982) (“If the Framers suspected legislative power, they distrusted executive power.  Mo-
tivated by their recent colonial history and Whig criticism of the Stuart kings, they denied 
the President most of the prerogatives that the Stuarts had exercised.”); see also FISHER, 
supra note 10, at 3–6 (noting the many proposals during the Constitutional Convention 
to limit powers expressly belonging to the King under the British model). 
 12 Louis Fisher, Historical Survey of the War Powers and the Use of Force, in THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION AND THE POWER TO GO TO WAR:  HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVES 
11, 13 (Gary M. Stern & Morton H. Halperin eds., 1994). 
 13 CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 479–81 (1928). 
 14 Id. at 480–81 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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therefore vested the war power in Congress,15 but a subtle change al-
lowed for some flexibility.  After a delegate suggested that Congress 
acted too slowly, James Madison, in a motion joined by Gerry, pro-
posed that the language be changed from giving Congress the power 
to "make" war to giving Congress the power to "declare" war.16  As the 
eminent constitutional scholar Charles Warren observed, the purpose 
of this change was to give the President the ability “to repel sudden 
attacks.”17  Roger Sherman of Connecticut elaborated by asserting 
that “the Executive should be able to repel and not commence, 
war.”18 
The decision to place the power to declare war with Congress re-
flected the Framers’ desire to curb executive power; by entrusting this 
decision to the legislature, the Constitution took a traditionally ex-
ecutive function away from the President.19  Nonetheless, the Presi-
dent was still given extensive powers related to the military and na-
tional security.  The President was declared to be “the Commander in 
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of 
the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United 
States.”20  This role gave the President some undefined power over 
the day-to-day control of the armed forces, but his ability to use them 
faced significant and well-enumerated congressional checks.  Con-
 
 15 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (“The Congress shall have Power to . . . declare War, grant 
Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Wa-
ter.”). 
 16 WARREN, supra note 13, at 480. 
 17 Id. at 480 n.2; see also STEVENSON, supra note 3, at 8 (stating that the change “would give 
the executive the power to repel sudden attacks” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  At 
that time, of course, the Framers had to take into consideration that Congress would only 
be in session for limited periods each term and that it could take weeks or even months 
to bring Congress together to declare war.  Those concerns have since been abated due 
to modern technological advances, but the Framers’ concerns about the proper role of 
Congress in actually commencing war, rather than repelling an attack, remain essential.  
See generally WILLIAM R. CASTO, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE AGE OF 
THE FIGHTING SAIL 174–75 (2006) (noting that, compared to the state of Congress during 
the Neutrality Crisis of 1793, in which Congress was not in session and unable to swiftly 
debate and act on legislation, today’s legislators are swiftly able to communicate, travel, 
and spur action, and that “the immense logistical problems confronting the founders no 
longer exist”). 
 18 STEVENSON, supra note 3, at 8. 
 19 See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 409 
(Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833) (“In Great Britain [the power to go to war] is the 
exclusive prerogative of the crown; and in other countries, it is usually, if not universally, 
confided in the executive department.”); John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1678 (2002) (“There can be little doubt that the decision to deploy 
military force is ‘executive’ in nature and was traditionally regarded as such.”). 
 20 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
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gress was given the power to “raise and support Armies,”21 to “provide 
and maintain a Navy,”22 to “make Rules for the Government and Reg-
ulation of the land and naval Forces,”23 and to call forth the militia of 
the states to “execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections, 
and repel Invasions.”24  The Constitution also gave Congress certain 
powers related to limited actions of war, such as the power to “grant 
Letters of Marque and Reprisal,” and to set rules on “Captures on 
Land and Water.”25  This showed that the Framers intended for Con-
gress to play a key role in authorizing and laying the legal ground-
work for limited wars.26 
The original understanding of the Constitution’s role for the Pres-
ident and Congress appeared to be that the President had the power 
to respond when war was imposed on the nation by attack or declara-
tion of war, but that the power to initiate offensive military action be-
longed to Congress.27  While the President commanded and directed 
operations of military forces,28 he could not make the decision to in-
 
 21 Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
 22 Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 13. 
 23 Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
 24 Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 15.  Notably, Congress’s ability to summon the militia of the states was 
limited to these three specific situations.  Neither Congress nor the President was given 
the ability to call forth the militia to initiate offensive action.  This omission may be due to 
the widespread disapproval of undertaking offensive war in the early conversations about 
the Constitution; the state militia was only made available for internal security and repel-
ling attacks and presumably could not be utilized for offensive warfare beyond American 
borders.  How the Framers would react to the National Guard being used overseas in an 
unprovoked offensive war, such as in the Iraq War, is an interesting question. 
 25 Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 26 In his concurring opinion in Bas v. Tingy, a decision regarding the salvaging of an Ameri-
can vessel recaptured from a French privateer during the United States’s undeclared war 
with France, Justice Samuel Chase noted Congress's power to wage limited war, writing: 
Congress is empowered to declare a general war, or congress may wage a limited 
war; limited in place, in objects, and in time.  If a general war is declared, its ex-
tent and operations are only restricted and regulated by the jus belli, forming a 
part of the law of nations; but if a partial war is waged, its extent and operation 
depend on our municipal laws. 
  Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37, 43 (1800) (Chase, J., concurring). 
 27 See Joseph R. Biden & John B. Ritch, Commentary, The War Power at a Constitutional Im-
passe:  A “Joint Decision” Solution, 77 GEO. L.J. 367, 374 (1988) (noting that “there appears 
little doubt that the Framers’ aim was to empower the President to respond when war was 
imposed on the nation, but not to empower him to undertake war on his own”); Francis 
D. Wormuth, The Nixon Theory of the War Power:  A Critique, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 623, 628 
(1972) (“The framers knew that an attack upon the United States imperiled national se-
curity.  They left to Congress the right to decide when other events imperil national secu-
rity.”). 
 28 This power was granted to the President through the Commander in Chief Clause.  U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and 
Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States.”). 
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itiate war on his own; the power to “engage the country in war” re-
mained in the hands of Congress.29 
The Constitution, however, was silent on the scope of the Presi-
dent’s power in responding to attack.  It was well established that the 
President could repel attacks and use defensive force,30 but under 
what circumstances the President could respond offensively after the 
nation had been attacked or after another nation had declared war 
was contested.31  On several occasions in the decades after the Consti-
tution went into effect, the United States faced attacks from foreign 
powers, spurring debate on how the President could respond.  One 
of the earliest examples involved the nation’s conflicts with Native 
American tribes during the presidency of George Washington.  In the 
early 1790s, elements of the Creek Nation launched attacks against 
American settlements on the frontier.32  President Washington wrote 
to South Carolina Governor William Moultrie that he hoped to 
launch an “offensive expedition” against the Creek Nation  
whenever Congress should decide that measure to be proper and neces-
sary.  The Constitution vests the power of declaring war with Congress; 
therefore no offensive expedition of importance can be undertaken 
[against the refractory part of the Creek Nation] until after [Congress] 
shall have deliberated upon the subject, and authorized such a meas-
ure.33 
In noting that “no offensive expedition of importance” could be 
waged without congressional authorization, it was clear that Washing-
ton believed that any major decision about the scope and objectives 
of an offensive military action must be determined by Congress.34  
President Washington’s Secretary of War, Henry Knox, echoed this 
view in the context of a conflict with a different tribe, writing that the 
 
 29 See Note, Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARV. L. REV. 
1771, 1773 (1968) (“When the proposal to substitute ‘declare’ for ‘make’ was introduced, 
the debates over the issue indicate that the new wording was not intended to shift from 
the legislature to the Executive this general power to engage the country in war.”). 
 30 WARREN, supra note 13, at 480 n.2 (discussing the President’s power to “repel sudden at-
tacks”). 
 31 See Botelho, supra note 4, at 316 (“On the surface, the intention of the Framers seems 
clear—Congress has the power to initiate offensive hostilities, while the President has the 
power to repel sudden attacks; however, the scope of the President’s power to make de-
fensive war was never defined.”). 
 32 See Randolph C. Downes, Creek-American Relations, 1790–1795, 8 J. S. HIST. 350, 356–57 
(1942) (discussing guerilla attacks by groups of Creeks on Americans in the early 1790s). 
 33 Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Separation and Overlap of War and Military Powers, 87 
TEX. L. REV. 299, 314–15 (2008) (quoting Letter from George Washington to William 
Moultrie (Aug. 28, 1793), in 33 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE 
ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES, 1745–1799, at 73 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940)). 
 34 See infra note 124. 
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President “does not conceive himself authorized to direct offensive 
operations against the Chickamaggas.  If such measures are to be 
pursued they must result from the decisions of Congress who solely 
are vested with the powers of War.”35  As the political institutions of 
the United States developed, it was commonly accepted that it was 
appropriate for Congress to play a central role in regulating the mili-
tary and setting the scope, conditions, and objectives of military op-
erations.36 
Perhaps the most prominent debate of the time over the war pow-
er involved the dueling views of Alexander Hamilton and James Mad-
ison, writing as “Pacificus” and “Helvidius” respectively, which took 
place before any of the major undeclared wars that involved the 
United States during the early years of the Republic.  These commen-
taries did not arise out of a presidential act of responding to foreign 
attack; to the contrary, the debate was spurred by President Washing-
ton’s declaration of neutrality in response to the expanding conflict 
on the European continent arising out of the French Revolution.37  
Nonetheless, President Washington’s declaration spurred controversy 
over the roles of the President and Congress in foreign affairs, which 
inevitably led to commentary on the war powers of each branch. 
Alexander Hamilton, writing under the pseudonym “Pacificus,” 
argued that the President had the power to use the full force of the 
American military in any way when war was forced upon the nation.  
Hamilton believed that if a foreign power declared war upon the 
United States, Congress did not need to play a direct role by invoking 
the power to “declare war” because war had already been declared.38  
Hamilton did, however, acknowledge that the actual decision to 
transfer from a state of peace to a state of war belonged to the legisla-
tive branch, not the President, writing that “the Legislature can alone 
declare war, can alone actually transfer the nation from a state of 
 
 35 Letter from Henry Knox to William Blount (Nov. 26, 1792), in 4 THE TERRITORIAL PAPERS 
OF THE UNITED STATES 220, 221 (Clarence Edwin Carter ed., 1936). 
 36 See Louis Fisher, The Barbary Wars:  Legal Precedent for Invading Haiti?, in THE 
CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 313, 313–17 (David Gray 
Adler & Larry N. George eds., 1996) (discussing a “pattern” established by Presidents 
Washington and Adams, and followed by their successors during the Barbary Wars, that 
“Congress had to authorize offensive military actions in advance”); Prakash, supra note 
33, at 303 (“Contrary to the modern view that the Commander in Chief enjoys exclusive 
operational authority, early legislators systematically regulated military operations.”). 
 37 See generally ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER:  
THE ORIGINS 103–16 (1976) (discussing Washington’s proclamation of neutrality). 
 38 Cf. FRANK LAMBERT, THE BARBARY WARS:  AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE IN THE ATLANTIC 
WORLD 131 (2005) (discussing Hamilton’s criticism of President Jefferson’s belief that 
there was a limitation on the President’s war power when the nation had been attacked). 
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peace to a state of hostility” and thus “[i]t is the province and duty of 
the executive to preserve to the nation the blessings of peace.  The 
Legislature alone can interrupt them by placing the nation in a state 
of war.”39  Later, in the context of the Barbary Wars, Hamilton criti-
cized President Thomas Jefferson for expressing any deference to 
Congress when the nation’s shipping had been raided without provo-
cation.40  At this point, he argued that the President possessed inhe-
rent power to respond to attack.41 
In response to Hamilton’s assertions during the neutrality contro-
versy, James Madison, writing as “Helvidius,” supported a strong con-
gressional role in the war power and distinct limitations on the Presi-
dent despite the powers granted to him.  As recounted by Robert J. 
Morgan, Madison argued that the President’s power as Commander 
in Chief of the army, navy, and militia when called into service “is in 
no way analogous to that of declaring war.”42  Instead, Madison be-
lieved that the powers to actually enter into a war and conduct the 
operations of war had to be placed in separate branches; in fact, the 
Commander-in-Chief power was “a striking demonstration of the in-
compatibility of vesting the powers of making war and directing its 
operations in the same branch of government.”43  The reason for this, 
according to Madison, was that those who had responsibility for con-
ducting the operations of war inherently could not safely determine 
when a war should be started, stopped, or continued; this power had 
to rest with a party less connected to the actual implementation of 
the conflict.44  The very functioning of this “great principle of free 
government” was grounded in the bedrock constitutional principle 
 
 39 Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1543, 1549 (2002) 
(quoting Letter of Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1793), in 4 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON 432, 443 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904)).  Writing earlier under the pseu-
donym “Publius” in the Federalist Papers, Hamilton also noted the limited nature of the 
President’s war powers: 
[The President’s authority] would amount to nothing more than the supreme 
command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and Ad-
miral of the Confederacy:  while that of the British King extends to the declaring of 
war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies; all which by the Constitu-
tion under consideration, would appertain to the Legislature. 
  THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 40 See infra text accompanying notes 95–96. 
 41 Id. 
 42 ROBERT J. MORGAN, JAMES MADISON ON THE CONSTITUTION AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 100 
(1988). 
 43 Id. 
 44 See id. (“The reason is that those who are to conduct the operations of war cannot ‘in the 
nature of things’ be safe judges of whether a war ought to be started, continued, or 
stopped.”). 
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that “the power of enacting laws is separated from that of executing 
them.”45  For Madison, then, the war power was merely an extension 
of this basic foundational principle underlying the Constitution. 
Even before the undeclared Barbary Wars, Congress demonstrat-
ed both its concern with extensive presidential war powers and its wil-
lingness to play a major role in an undeclared or limited war.  Most 
prominently, Congress forcefully showed its concern with extensive 
executive power over the military during the so-called Quasi-War with 
France of 1798–1800.  During the presidencies of George Washing-
ton and John Adams, tensions with France, which was engulfed in 
revolution and war on the European continent, had risen dramatical-
ly.46  During this crisis, the Adams administration sought broad au-
thority over military matters, including, most controversially, the 
power to raise an army at the President’s discretion.47  Due to wide-
spread concern in Congress (largely amongst the opposition Repub-
licans) that such an authorization would put far too much power into 
the hands of the executive, or could even be considered unconstitu-
tional, the final amended bill passed by Congress placed temporal 
and situational restrictions on the President’s power to raise an army.  
The finished bill “authorize[d] the President, ‘till the next meeting of 
Congress,’ to raise troops ‘in the event of a declaration of war against 
the United States, or of an actual invasion . . . or of imminent danger 
to such invasion, discovered, in his opinion, to exist.’”48  This conce-
dedly granted much discretion to the President, as the language indi-
cated the ability to determine whether there was a threat of “immi-
nent invasion,” which would trigger the President’s ability to raise an 
army, rested within the judgment of the President himself.49  Howev-
er, the views expressed in the bill accurately reflected the concerns 
expressed during the Constitutional Convention, particularly that the 
President should be able to act in response to an immediate threat or 
 
 45 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 46 See James Morton Smith, Background for Repression:  America’s Half-War with France and the 
Internal Security Legislation of 1798, 18 HUNTINGTON LIBR. Q. 37, 39 (1954) (describing the 
belligerent military and diplomatic actions of France toward the United States in the 
1790s that led to the Quasi-War of 1798–1800). 
 47 See SOFAER, supra note 37, at 144 (“By far the most heated delegation debate . . . was over 
the proposal to authorize the President to raise a substantial army when he deemed it ne-
cessary.”). 
 48 Id. at 145 (quoting Act of May 28, 1798, ch. 47, 1 Stat. 558) (alteration in original). 
 49 See William J. Murphy, John Adams:  The Politics of the Additional Army, 1798–1800, 52 NEW 
ENG. Q. 234, 237 (1979) (“A careful reading of this act indicates that the provisional army 
was an emergency force to be organized only in case of an immediate crisis between the 
second and third sessions of the Fifth Congress.”). 
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attack, but should not be able to act aggressively without the consent 
of Congress. 
Hamilton and Madison did not settle the debate; scholars have in-
terpreted the balance of power between the branches in various ways 
since the Constitution’s inception.  Louis Fisher, for example, argued 
that the power of the President was very limited indeed, asserting that 
the President was given a “carefully limited” power to “repel sudden 
attacks in an emergency when Congress was not in session.”50  This 
power was seen as restricted to situations when the United States was 
attacked on the mainland or on the seas.51  In an article condemning 
President Harry Truman’s use of force in Korea without the approval 
of Congress, Fisher wrote, “[t]he decision to place U.S. troops in 
combat and to take the nation from a condition of peace to a state of 
war requires approval by Congress in advance.  That was the constitu-
tional principle in 1787.  It has not changed today.”52  Michael D. 
Ramsey demonstrated that the meaning of a “declaration of war” at 
the time the Constitution was written was considered both armed at-
tack and formal declaration.53  He therefore concluded, “[b]ecause 
war can be declared by commencing hostilities as well as by formal 
announcement, it should be clear from the text that Congress has 
power over both sorts of declarations, and the President does not.”54  
Congress thus had the main authority regarding the power to make 
war.  Francis Wormuth and Edwin Firmage emphasized that the de-
bates during the Constitutional Convention stressed “that Congress 
was to have the policy-making role of ‘judging . . . the causes of 
war’ . . . .”55  In terms of war, therefore, Congress was to have the “pol-
icy-making” role.56  Wormuth and Firmage believed that Congress 
needed to play a crucial role in the United States’ involvement in a 
war no matter how it started, asserting that “the President’s war pow-
er was to be limited both by the exigencies of the ‘sudden attack’ giv-
ing rise to its use and by the responsibility to defer to the policy-making 
 
 50 Fisher, supra note 12, at 13. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Louis Fisher, The Korean War:  On What Legal Basis Did Truman Act?, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 21, 
37 (1995). 
 53 See Ramsey, supra note 39, at 1545 (observing that, at the time the Constitution was 
drafted, “‘declaring war’ meant initiating a state of war by a public act, and it was unders-
tood that this could be done either by a formal declaration or by commencing armed hos-
tilities”). 
 54 Id. at 1546.  Ramsey also acknowledged that, under the understanding of war at that time, 
the President did have the power to respond to attack.  Id. 
 55 FRANCIS D. WORMUTH & EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, TO CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR:  THE WAR POWER 
OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW 70 (2d. ed. 1989) (alteration in original). 
 56 Id. 
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branch of the government at the earliest possible moment.”57  Other scholars, 
most prominently John C. Yoo, argued that the President has the abil-
ity to initiate hostilities without consent of Congress.58  Yoo asserted 
that the language of the text did not create a “Congress-first” metho-
dology for who decides to initiate war,59 and that the Constitution 
creates a more flexible system in which the President has greater 
powers than many pro-Congress advocates argue.60 
Overall, it seems clear that the original interpretation of the Con-
stitution meant for Congress to be the key actor in initiating or dec-
laring war, while the President was meant to have the authority to act 
defensively when the nation was attacked.  However, the Constitution 
was silent on a type of conflict that has now become predominant:  
undeclared war.  The Framers were certainly familiar with the con-
cept of undeclared war,61 and the United States fought in several such 
conflicts in the early 19th century.  The response of the United States 
to the aggression of the Barbary States of North Africa toward Ameri-
can vessels during the presidencies of Thomas Jefferson and James 
Madison show how many of these early thinkers believed undeclared 
war should be handled. 
II.  EARLY WARS WITHOUT CONGRESSIONAL DECLARATIONS:  
INTERACTIONS OF CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT DURING                    
THE BARBARY WARS 
The unique situation of undeclared war provides an effective way 
to look at the early views on the proper roles of the President and 
Congress.  Congress did declare war on Britain in 1812, marking the 
first declared war in the nation’s history.62  However, Presidents Tho-
mas Jefferson and James Madison both faced situations of undeclared 
war against foreign powers.  Their actions demonstrate the common 
 
 57 Id. (emphasis added). 
 58 See Yoo, supra note 19, at 1641–42 (constructing a theory of presidential war power “that 
provides presidents with authority to initiate hostilities”). 
 59 See John C. Yoo, Kosovo, War Powers, and the Multilateral Future, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1673, 
1691 (2000) (comparing the Declare War Clause to other sections of the Constitution 
and arguing that “if the Framers had intended to impose a strict, Congress-first, warmak-
ing process, they would have used different language”). 
 60 See Yoo, supra note 19, at 1662 (emphasizing the “flexib[ility]” of the constitutional system 
of war powers). 
 61 See Botelho, supra note 4, at 316. 
 62 DAVID LOCKE HALL, THE REAGAN WARS:  A CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON WAR POWERS 
AND THE PRESIDENCY 35 n.146 (1991) (stating that President James Madison’s acts as 
Commander in Chief during the War of 1812 were not unilateral since the war had been 
declared by Congress). 
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early idea that it was within the province of Congress to decide 
whether to go to war and what its scope should be and that the Presi-
dent should defer to Congress in such broad decisions of policy re-
lated to war. 
A.  President Jefferson and the First Barbary War:  Establishing Congress’s 
Role 
One of the first situations that tested how the President should act 
without a congressional declaration of war was President Jefferson’s 
handling of attacks on American shipping by several North African 
nations known as the “Barbary States.”  These conflicts consisted of 
acts of unprovoked aggression against the United States.  The Bar-
bary States of Tunis, Tripoli, Algiers, and Morocco threatened Euro-
pean powers’ Mediterranean commerce essentially as a matter of pol-
icy; from threats or actual violence, these states collected hefty sums 
in bounties, bribes, and tributes.63  Upon the establishment of the 
United States, the Barbary States extended those actions to American 
shipping.64  For the first two decades of America’s independence, the 
Washington and Adams administrations attempted to maintain the 
security of American ships by paying off the North African warlords 
through congressional appropriation of funds.65  Despite the Ameri-
can attempts to appease the Barbary States, there were intermittent 
incidents of ships and pirates backed by the North African states at-
tacking and capturing American commercial vessels, and even enslav-
ing American sailors.66  Upon his ascension to the presidency in 1801, 
Thomas Jefferson was determined to respond to these attacks with 
military force rather than continuing to pay tributes, which to this 
point had been ineffective and, in his opinion, wasteful.67  He con-
 
 63 See generally JOSHUA E. LONDON, VICTORY IN TRIPOLI:  HOW AMERICA’S WAR WITH THE 
BARBARY PIRATES ESTABLISHED THE U.S. NAVY AND BUILT A NATION 17–26 (2005) (discuss-
ing the threat of the Barbary piracy in the Mediterranean). 
 64 MICHAEL B. OREN, POWER, FAITH, AND FANTASY:  AMERICA IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1776 TO 
THE PRESENT 20 (2007). 
 65 See KENNETH B. MOSS, UNDECLARED WAR AND THE FUTURE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 50–51 
(2008) (discussing the difficulties that the Barbary States posed to the Washington and 
Adams administrations).  In the earliest days of the Republic, when the United States was 
at its weakest on the world stage, Congress was not above essentially appropriating bribe 
money to the Barbary States to prevent attacks on American shipping.  See OREN, supra 
note 64, at 28, 33. 
 66 MOSS, supra note 65, at 51. 
 67 LAMBERT, supra note 38, at 124. 
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vened his Cabinet in March of 1801 to discuss how to respond to the 
Barbary acts of aggression.68 
Jefferson had already written approvingly of the Constitution’s 
placing of the power to declare war with Congress; he wrote to James 
Madison in 1789, “[w]e have already given in example one effectual 
check to the Dog of war by transferring the power of letting him 
loose from the Executive to the Legislative body.”69  The power to 
react defensively, however, remained unclear.  Jefferson’s advisors 
urged that the President authorize the use of military force to reta-
liate against the Barbary States rather than seek an actual declaration 
of war.70  Only one member of the Cabinet, Attorney General Levi 
Lincoln, was skeptical of the President’s power to respond unilateral-
ly.71  The Cabinet reconvened in May to again discuss the issue; at this 
point, the Cabinet was unanimous that some action should and could 
be taken.  There was still debate over whether the President could au-
thorize the use of offensive force; Attorney General Lincoln main-
tained that American naval vessels should be limited to the ability to 
“repel an attack on individual vessels, but after the repulse, may not 
proceed to destroy the enemy’s vessels generally.”72 
President Jefferson’s initial response was unilateral executive ac-
tion:  he authorized sending an American fleet to the Mediterranean 
without consulting Congress.  Historians such as Joseph Wheelan 
have argued that this action by President Jefferson “established the 
president’s authority to unilaterally send armed forces abroad.”73  
However, Jefferson’s actual instructions reflected concerns about 
overstepping the authority of the executive under the Constitution.74  
Accordingly, Jefferson sided with Attorney General Lincoln’s view, 
which historian Frank Lambert described as “close adherence to the 
letter of the Constitution.”75  Jefferson gave detailed instructions to 
 
 68 See LONDON, supra note 63, at 92 (discussing Attorney General Levi Lincoln’s expressed 
disapproval during the Cabinet meeting about going to war against the Barbary pirates). 
 69 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, 27 MARCH 1789 TO 30 NOVEMBER 1789, at 392, 397 (Julian P. Boyd, 
ed., 1958). 
 70 LONDON, supra note 63, at 94. 
 71 Id. at 92. 
 72 LAMBERT, supra note 38, at 126 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 73 JOSEPH WHEELAN, JEFFERSON’S WAR:  AMERICA’S FIRST WAR ON TERROR 1801–1805, at 105 
(2003).  However, Wheelan concedes that Jefferson’s actions were taken with contempo-
rary practical considerations in mind regarding the time it would take for members of 
Congress to travel to Washington.  Id. 
 74 See LAMBERT, supra note 38, at 126 (“[A]s strict constructionists, Jefferson and his Repub-
lican colleagues wanted to ensure the constitutionality of their action.”). 
 75 Id. 
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Commodore Dale, the commander of the flotilla, to act in defense of 
American ships and not initiate hostilities unless a declaration of war 
had been issued by Tripoli or another of the Barbary States.76  Specif-
ically, Dale was given instructions to “sink, burn, capture, or destroy 
vessels attacking those of the United States.”77  Jefferson therefore condi-
tioned the use of offensive force on fending off attacks against Amer-
ican ships and sailors.78  His approach suggests some important limi-
tations on the President’s power to respond to attacks.  First, he 
authorized the use of naval force to combat Tripoli’s use of naval 
force; the action was equal to Tripoli’s action.  He did not send ma-
rines or ground troops to subdue Tripoli as his initial response to the 
Tripolitan aggression.  Only later, after Congress passed a statute 
supporting “warlike operations against the regency of Tripoli, or any 
other of the Barbary powers,”79 did American marines participate on 
land in the Barbary conflict.80  Second, by only instructing the flotilla 
commander to attack ships already attacking those of the United 
States, he emphasized that, if he acted unilaterally, he only had the 
authority to act defensively. 
The implications of the President’s deployment of the naval force 
without congressional consent or guidance were demonstrated in one 
of the first battles between American and Tripolitan forces.  In Au-
gust of 1801, the American schooner Enterprise encountered the Tripo-
li, a Tripolitan pirate vessel, and proceeded to overwhelm the enemy 
ship with superior firepower, killing many of the crew and disabling 
the enemy ship without a single casualty.81  However, the commander 
of the Enterprise, aware that Congress had not declared war on Tripoli 
and had only authorized defensive action, actually released the cap-
tured Tripolitan survivors and the ship itself.82  The lack of a declara-
 
 76 HALL, supra note 62, at 31–32. 
 77 ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., THE WAR-MAKING POWERS OF THE 
PRESIDENT 53 (1982) (emphasis added). 
 78 As Frank Lambert recounted, Jefferson “instructed the navy to engage any enemy vessel 
that attacked American shipping, but not to pursue corsairs in offensive engagements nor to 
take them as prizes.”  LAMBERT, supra note 38, at 126 (emphasis added). 
 79 Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 46, 2 Stat. 291. 
 80 See generally LOUIS B. WRIGHT & JULIA H. MACLEOD, THE FIRST AMERICANS IN NORTH 
AFRICA:  WILLIAM EATON’S STRUGGLE FOR A VIGOROUS POLICY AGAINST THE BARBARY 
PIRATES 1799–1805, at 158, 172–74 (Greenwood Press 1969) (1945) (describing the par-
ticipation of a small number of American marines and sailors in a ground campaign 
against Tripoli); WHEELAN, supra note 73, at 111–12 (discussing the composition and dy-
namic of the American military personnel involved in the Barbary conflict). 
 81 LAMBERT, supra note 38, at 128–30. 
 82 Id. at 130.  As Michael B. Oren recounted, the Tripoli “was allowed to limp home” after 
defeat, where her commander was “publicly flogged and pelted with tripe” for his failure.  
OREN, supra note 64, at 56. 
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tion of war, or guidance from Congress to act in an offensive matter, 
heavily constrained the power of the President and the military.83  
Based on the understanding of the Constitution at the time, the cap-
tain of the Enterprise declined to go beyond a defensive posture with-
out guidance or approval from Congress. 
Upon seeing the practical effects of not having congressional ap-
proval to act offensively, Jefferson went to Congress in December 1801 
to describe the American victory over the Tripoli and ask for congres-
sional sanction of more aggressive measures.  In his message to Con-
gress, President Jefferson wrote: 
Unauthorized by the Constitution, without the sanction of Congress, to 
go beyond the line of defense, the [defeated Tripolitan] vessel, being 
disabled from committing further hostilities, was liberated with its crew.  
The Legislature will doubtless consider whether, by authorizing measures 
of offence also, they will place our force on an equal footing with that of 
its adversaries.  I communicate all material information on this subject, 
that, in the exercise of this important function confided by the Constitu-
tion to the Legislature exclusively, their judgment may form itself on a 
knowledge and consideration of every circumstance of weight.84 
Jefferson’s assertion that he was “unauthorized by the Constitution, 
without the sanction of Congress, to go beyond the line of defense” 
reflected the deference that the Framers meant for the President to 
have to Congress in matters of offensive war.85  Jefferson also appro-
priately noted that “[i]t was up to Congress to authorize ‘measures of 
offense also.’”86  Jefferson wanted more authority to act offensively 
against the Barbary pirates but recognized that he was effectively con-
strained by how the legislature authorized and defined war.87  In Feb-
ruary of 1802, the Congress granted the President the ability to act 
offensively by passing an “Act for the Protection of Commerce and 
Seamen of the United States, against the Tripolitan Cruisers.”88  Con-
gress did not officially declare war; however, as historian Frank Lam-
bert observed, “[Congress] eliminated constitutional reservations” 
and authorized the President to use full offensive force.89 
 
 83 LAMBERT, supra note 38, at 130.  Lambert wrote that this action “revealed a flaw in the 
Constitution’s allocation of war-making powers.”  Id. 
 84 Sofaer, supra note 37, at 212 (quoting 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 12 (1801)). 
 85 See supra text accompanying notes 13–18 (discussing the debate over the war power dur-
ing the Constitutional Convention of 1787). 
 86 Fisher, supra note 10, at 34; see supra text accompanying note 84. 
 87 See LAMBERT, supra note 38, at 130 (“While respecting the constitutional requirement that 
the legislature declare and define war, Jefferson sought greater authority to defeat the 
Barbary States.”). 
 88 Act for the Protection of Commerce and Seamen of the United States, Against the Tripo-
litan Cruisers, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 129 (1802). 
 89 LAMBERT, supra note 38, at 132–33. 
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Jefferson’s actual view on the war power of the President is still 
debated by legal scholars.  Louis Fisher argued that President Jeffer-
son’s decision was indicative of his view that deference to Congress in 
matters of offensive war was proper under the Constitution.90  Others, 
including Ann Van Wynan Thomas and A.J. Thomas, Jr., argued that 
Jefferson’s view of presidential war power was actually quite broad, “at 
least when confronted with a declaration of war from another state.”91  
Jefferson’s approach to Congress to obtain authority for offensive ac-
tion, they argue, was in fact a political maneuver to persuade Con-
gress to explicitly provide authority to act offensively.92  David Locke 
Hall, basing his argument on Jefferson’s instructions to Commodore 
Dale,93 asserted that Jefferson believed in the President’s ability to un-
ilaterally make war.94  Even Hall, however, tempered that assertion by 
noting that while the behavior of the first three presidents indicated 
that “the idea of presidential war-making was acceptable to the 
Founding Fathers,” such unilateral executive action was appropriate 
only “under some circumstances,” seemingly limited to when the 
United States had not instigated the conflict.95 
A major question still remains:  while President Jefferson’s actions 
were appropriate, were they necessary?  At the time, Alexander Ham-
ilton argued that Jefferson’s deference to Congress was not a consti-
tutional requirement.  Hamilton wrote that the President’s ability to 
respond to a foreign nation’s attack or declaration of war meant that 
Congress needed not play a role at all; at that point, “any declaration 
on the part of Congress is nugatory; it is at least unnecessary.”96  Al-
though Hamilton was critical of any executive deference to Congress 
 
 90 See FISHER, supra note 10, at 36. 
 91 THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 77, at 53. 
 92 See id. (“The limited tenor of [Jefferson’s] language to the Congress was tactical to help 
persuade Congress to provide expressly for offensive action, which was indeed forthcom-
ing.  It did not indicate a belief that power to act offensively by the President was not con-
stitutional.”). 
 93 Hall called Jefferson’s instructions “so belligerent that it cannot be read in any way which 
denies President Jefferson’s clear intention to wage war unilaterally at any provocation.”  
HALL, supra note 62, at 32. 
 94 See id. (“For the purpose of legal analysis, it is enough to suggest that the operating order 
to Commodore Dale establishes that in practice Jefferson believed in unilateral presiden-
tial war-making.”).  John Yoo also expressed this opinion of Jefferson handling of the sit-
uation, writing that his message to Congress “presents an example of a President’s rhetor-
ic not matching his actions.”  See JOHN YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND:  THE HISTORY OF 
EXECUTIVE POWER FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON TO GEORGE W. BUSH 113 (2009). 
 95 HALL, supra note 62, at 32. 
 96 Alexander Hamilton, Examination of Jefferson’s Message to Congress of December 7, 1801, in 7 
THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 744, 747 (John C. Hamilton ed., New York, John F. 
Trow 1851). 
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when the United States was reacting to a declaration of war or hostile 
conduct, he acknowledged that the power to actually “go to war,” that 
is, to initiate war, was entirely within the power of Congress.97 
Whether Jefferson’s deference to Congress was actually necessary 
is still unclear.  Michael Ramsey argued that, according to the ideas of 
war around the time of the founding, Jefferson’s request for congres-
sional authorization was not necessary.98  Ramsey argued that war it-
self could be declared in three ways:  declaration by Congress, delega-
tion of the authority to declare war to the President, or declaration of 
war by the foreign state.99  Once a state of war existed via any of these 
three methods, the President’s conduct of the war, whether defensive 
or offensive, was authorized.100  Because Tripoli had declared war on 
the United States, under Ramsey’s approach, Jefferson already had 
the authority to act offensively, and did not need to seek approval of 
such actions from Congress.101  While Ramsey’s view has a solid 
grounding in the historical understanding of war at the time of the 
Founding, it inadequately takes into account the decision-making 
role of Congress in war.  Acting in defense of an attack is a presiden-
tial prerogative, but the actual decision to expand or change the ob-
jectives of a war was meant to be entrusted to Congress.  Ramsey 
therefore ignores the crucial decision- and policy-making authority of 
Congress by declaring that the President has unlimited power over 
war-making when another nation attacks the United States.  In fact, as 
Louis Fisher observes, Jefferson’s actions were appropriately deferen-
tial to the decision-making branch.102 
The interaction of President Jefferson and Congress in response 
to the Barbary threat helps to establish a framework of the early views 
of how the President could respond to a foreign attack and when he 
needed to obtain congressional sanction for his actions.  President 
Jefferson had the ability to dispatch naval forces to the Mediterra-
nean to protect American shipping.  As American civilian vessels were 
being attacked by a belligerent power, it was well within Jefferson’s 
power as expressed during the Constitutional Convention to repel 
 
 97 Id. at 746; MOSS, supra note 65, at 51–52. 
 98 Ramsey, supra note 39, at 1629–30. 
 99 Id. at 1631. 
100 See id. at 1630 (“In short, the power to wage a defensive war included both the tactical 
defensive and the tactical offensive:  The key question was how it was begun, not how it 
was fought.”). 
101 See id. at 1631 (asserting that “[o]nce the state of war is created in any of these three ways, 
the President has full power to pursue it to the end”). 
102 See FISHER, supra note 10, at 35–36. 
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such a “sudden attack.”103  However, Jefferson was rightly concerned 
that his options were limited to responding to Tripoli’s aggressive ac-
tions by defending the American ships.  This belief was reflected by the 
actions of the Enterprise in merely disabling the Tripolitan ship that 
was preying on American commerce.104  Jefferson thus went to Con-
gress, which he staunchly believed had the power to authorize offen-
sive war; in fact, Jefferson turned to Congress ten times for various 
authorizations to use force against the Barbary pirates.105  Jefferson’s 
actions reflected his view that the proper time for the President to act 
unilaterally, without the consent of Congress, was when the very sur-
vival and safety of the nation, or its citizens, was at risk.106  When the 
military operation was to take an offensive character, Jefferson ap-
propriately believed that congressional consent was required.107 
B.  President Madison and the Second Barbary War:  Ensuring Congressional 
Authorization 
In the weeks and months following the end of hostilities with 
Great Britain in 1815, the American government finally turned its at-
tention back toward the Barbary States.  Encouraged by the British,108 
the Dey of Algiers refused to accept American offers of tribute begin-
ning in 1812, and proceeded to capture and impress American ships 
and sailors.109  After the Treaty of Ghent ending the war with Great 
Britain was ratified in February 1815, President Madison was infu-
riated by the Dey of Algiers’s continued preying on American ship-
ping and refusal to release American sailors whom his forces had en-
slaved.110  However, unlike his predecessor, Thomas Jefferson, 
Madison did not immediately order American naval forces to the 
Mediterranean.  Instead, he formally asked Congress to declare “the 
existence of a state of war between the United States and the Dey and 
Regency of Algiers.”111 
 
103 See supra text accompanying notes 13–18. 
104 See supra text accompanying notes 81–83. 
105 MOSS, supra note 65, at 51. 
106 See Fisher, supra note 12, at 36 (arguing that Jefferson “was not opening the door to any 
and all presidential initiatives” but advocating “presidential actions in response to emer-
gencies that threatened the survival of the nation”). 
107 Id. 
108 The British had offered their support and protection to Algiers if they would interrupt 
the shipping of their American enemies as the War of 1812 started.  LAMBERT, supra note 
38, at 183–84. 
109 Id. at 188. 
110 Id. at 189. 
111 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Congress debated the issue in late February and early March of 
1815.112  On March 3, Congress declined President James Madison’s 
request for a formal declaration of war against Algiers,113 but did in-
stead issue an authorization for the President to use military force 
similar to the congressional authorization issued in 1802.114  Congress 
specifically laid out its grant of power, giving American vessels the au-
thority “to subdue, seize, and make prize of all vessels, goods and ef-
fects of or belonging to the Dey of Algiers.”115  President Madison thus 
had the authority to conduct naval operations against Algiers, without 
any of the constraints President Jefferson or Commodore Dale saw 
themselves as having due to a lack of congressional guidance in 
1801.116 
President Madison built upon the opinion of President Jefferson 
that deferring to Congress was essential to undertaking offensive op-
erations.  At the time Madison went to Congress, he had the ability 
under the Constitution to send a fleet to the Mediterranean once 
again to defend American ships and sailors under attack.  However, 
perhaps with the limitations Jefferson had in 1801 in mind, he went 
to Congress first to ensure he had authority for both defensive and 
offensive military action.  By obtaining such authority, Madison con-
tinued the standard practice of the time of deferring to Congress as 
the policy-making body in matters of war. 
C.  Implications of the Barbary Wars 
Both Barbary Wars demonstrate two essential facts about what is 
required for the United States to fight in a war.  First, an official dec-
laration of war is not necessary to undertake military action against 
another nation.  The President can order the armed forces to re-
spond to a direct attack on the United States, even if it is beyond its 
borders, without consulting Congress.  The first Barbary War demon-
strates this example:  shortly after being inaugurated, President Jef-
ferson responded to the aggression of Tripoli by sending an Ameri-
can naval force with instructions to defend American commercial 
 
112 Id. 
113 This was one of only two times in American history that Congress has voted on a declara-
tion of war that failed to pass.  The other was in 1999, when there was a 213–213 tie vote 
on the decision to declare war on Serbia prior to the NATO air campaign aimed at stop-
ping the genocide taking place in Kosovo.  Michael Hahn, Note, The Conflict in Kosovo:  A 
Constitutional War?, 89 GEO. L.J. 2351, 2377 (2001). 
114 STEVENSON, supra note 3, at 17. 
115 Act of Mar. 3, 1815, ch. 90, 3 Stat. 230. 
116 See supra text accompanying notes 81–89. 
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ships.  Second, the nation can engage in offensive warfare through a 
congressional authorization short of a declaration of war.  This took 
place during both of the major Barbary conflicts.  These observations 
lead to the important question of what the intended role for each 
branch is when the United States is faced with a foreign conflict.  The 
answer, as the next Part discusses, may be determined by how the 
conflict begins and whether the United States is initiating or reacting 
to the use of force. 
III.  THE BARBARY FRAMEWORK:  THE ROLES OF CONGRESS AND           
THE PRESIDENT IN WAR 
The Barbary Wars lay the groundwork for the key distinction be-
tween legislative and executive war-making power.  Defensive warfare 
lies within the power of the President, while the decision to under-
take offensive warfare is the responsibility of Congress.  This Part first 
discusses the constitutional, historical, and scholarly views that sup-
port this distinction and then defines what scenarios fall within the 
meaning of “offensive war” and “defensive war.” 
A.  Congress and the President in “Offensive” and “Defensive” War 
The original perspectives regarding undeclared war and their im-
plementation during the Barbary Wars present an opportunity to 
forge a framework reflecting the original meaning of the Constitu-
tion for the proper roles of Congress and the President in war.  
Where a foreign nation had actually attacked the United States or de-
clared war on the United States, the President would have the power 
to respond immediately.117  The scope of the President’s power to re-
spond to attack, however, was limited.  As Peter Raven-Hansen ob-
served, “the history of the framing and ratification supports an im-
plied constitutional authority of the President to repel a sudden 
attack.  But nothing in that history suggests that this authority ex-
tends beyond literally repelling the attack.”118  It was generally ac-
 
117 In 1863, the Supreme Court, in approving President Lincoln’s authority to institute a 
blockade on the rebelling southern states, supported the view that the President could 
react to foreign attack or rebellion without congressional approval.  See The Brig Amy 
Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. 635, 668 (1863) (“If a war be made by invasion of a 
foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force.  
He does not initiate war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any 
special legislative authority.”). 
118 Peter Raven-Hansen, Constitutional Constraints:  The War Clause, in THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
AND THE POWER TO GO TO WAR 29, 35 (Gary M. Stern & Morton H. Haperin eds., 1994). 
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knowledged in the early years of the United States’ existence that the 
president had to go to Congress if he wanted to go beyond self-
defense and undertake offensive action.119  Therefore, in an undec-
lared war started by a foreign power, the President should be autho-
rized by Congress to use of offensive force.  By contrast, if the United 
States is to initiate or “declare” war, the Constitution explicitly places 
that power with Congress.120 
Based on the early views surrounding the war power, the most 
plausible approach is that the need for congressional approval is trig-
gered when the conflict takes an offensive character.  Congress, after 
all, was intended by the Framers to be the “policy-making branch” in 
the context of war;121 the question of extending a war from defending 
the United States to offensive measures against the attackers is cer-
tainly a question of policy, not just a question of strategy.  Further-
more, as Francis Wormuth and Edwin Firmage recognized, the Fra-
mers intended for the President’s war power “to be 
limited . . . by . . . the responsibility to defer to the policy-making 
branch of the government at the earliest possible moment.”122  Sai-
krishna Prakash effectively summarized early presidential views:  “No 
early President felt free to wage war merely because another nation 
had declared war on the United States.  Each understood that to 
wage war was to declare it, a power the Constitution granted Congress 
and not the President.”123  Having the President turn to Congress for 
authority to conduct offensive operations places that important poli-
cy-making responsibility in the hands of the branch that the Framers 
intended for it to be.124  This reflects the Jeffersonian view of warfare; 
as Louis Fisher observed, “Jefferson . . . distinguished between defen-
 
119 See id. (noting that early customary law showed that “presidents conceded the need for 
congressional authority to go beyond immediate self-defense”). 
120 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
121 WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 55, at 70. 
122 Id. 
123 Saikrishna Prakash, Unleashing the Dogs of War:  What the Constitution Means by “Declare 
War,” 93 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 51 (2007). 
124 President Washington’s actions seem to accord with this view.  As recounted by Saikrishna 
Prakash, in the context of Creek and Chickasaw offensive actions against the United 
States in 1792 and 1793, 
Various governors wrote to the President seeking authority for offensive opera-
tions against the tribes.  Washington and his Cabinet agreed that only Congress 
could authorize offensive measures because only Congress could declare war.  At 
the same time, Washington and his Cabinet concluded that defensive measures 
designed to repel attacks were permissible because such measures did not usurp 
Congress’s Declare War power . . . . Because defensive uses of force were not dec-
larations of war, the Executive could order defensive measures without running 
afoul of the congressional monopoly on declaring war. 
  Prakash, supra note 33, at 359 (citations omitted). 
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sive and offensive military operations, permitting presidential initia-
tives for the former but not the latter.”125 
The extent of Congress’s involvement, however, need not always 
be a declaration of war.  An actual declaration is the strongest action 
that Congress could take; therefore, it is appropriate that Congress be 
required to declare war if the United States is to initiate hostilities 
without provocation.  When the United States itself is attacked, how-
ever, the President should have the authority to defend the nation, 
but must seek congressional approval to begin offensive operations.  
Because war has been initiated by another country, a declaration 
should be unnecessary; nonetheless, congressional approval should 
be sought in a lesser form, such as simple authorization to use offen-
sive force. 
Both Barbary Wars reflect this proposed framework.  In the first 
Barbary War, President Jefferson sent ships to the Mediterranean in 
response to Tripolitan attacks on American shipping, which eventual-
ly culminated in a declaration of war on the United States by Tripo-
li.126  American ships proceeded to act only in a defensive nature.  
American naval forces only took an offensive posture when Congress 
granted full authority to do so to the President in 1802.127  President 
Madison immediately went to Congress upon the conclusion of the 
War of 1812 and received the authority to act offensively before he 
sent American naval forces to confront the Dey of Algiers’s pirate ves-
sels.128  However, a declaration of war from Congress was unnecessary 
in both situations; war had already been declared by Tripoli and Al-
giers, respectively.  Instead, congressional authorization to act offen-
sively was sufficient, fulfilling its role as the policy-making branch in 
decisions of war. 
This approach reflects upon the original preference for Congress 
to be the key decision-maker in matters of war, and also balances the 
necessity of the President’s responsibility to act as Commander in 
Chief.  Under this framework, the President’s ability to defend the 
nation is preserved.  If the President acts defensively, the decision to 
go to war was made by another power, and the President’s use of mili-
tary force would not be acting outside of his constitutional authority.  
However, by seeking authorization from Congress to undertake of-
fensive action, the Framers’ desire for the legislative branch to play a 
central role in the question of war powers is preserved.  This reflects 
 
125 FISHER, supra note 10, at 36. 
126 LONDON, supra note 63, at 95. 
127 See supra text accompanying note 89. 
128 See supra text accompanying notes 108–15. 
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on Saikrishna Prakash’s proposal of a “[u]nitary [w]ar [p]ower” in 
Congress, in which Congress would have the authority to determine 
the parameters of war.129  Furthermore, it preserves Congress as the 
true decision-making body when it comes to war.  Defending the na-
tion from attack does not so much involve a decision to use force; na-
tions are essentially obligated to do so to defend their sovereignty and 
existence.130  The President would have no decision to make; as 
Commander in Chief, he has the authority to direct the military to 
defend the nation, and the decision to use this force was made by the 
attacking nation.  However, the ability to change the objectives of the 
war from defending the nation to an offensive posture, possibly in-
volving attack and occupation, is a policy decision to be made, and 
that crucial decision must rest with Congress. 
The fact that the Constitution vests the power to declare war in 
Congress indicates that the Framers wanted Congress to play at least 
some role in the decision to undertake offensive warfare, even if it 
stems from a defensive war that the President could unilaterally en-
gage in.  In his seminal book War and Responsibility, John Hart Ely laid 
out the reasons that such a momentous decision was placed in the 
hands of Congress: 
It was Congress’s job not simply to insist on getting the facts straight before 
giving the president a functional declaration of war, but also to decide 
for itself just how great an emergency there was.  That’s why we have sep-
arate branches.  That’s why the war power is vested in Congress.131 
For these same reasons, Congress must have a say in a decision the 
Framers recognized was so important. 
Importantly, under this framework, a declaration of war would not 
be necessary in all situations where the United States uses force; if war 
were to be thrust upon the United States by a foreign power, the Pres-
ident could act defensively.  He would merely need congressional au-
thorization to take the war to an offensive footing.132  This factor em-
phasizes that Congress is the ultimate possessor of the war power.  If 
Congress were to decide not to authorize offensive war after the 
United States had been attacked, it would be its prerogative to do 
 
129 See Prakash, supra note 123, at 60. 
130 See U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right 
of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations . . . .”). 
131 JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY:  CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS 
AFTERMATH 20 (1993). 
132 See KEYNES, supra note 11, at 38 (“The decision to engage the nation in offensive hostili-
ties or limited war is a congressional decision.”). 
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so.133  If the power to change the status between the United States and 
another nation from peace to war rests with Congress, then Congress 
should also have some input in the decision to expand a war from in-
herently defensive to actually offensive.  President Jefferson adhered 
to this requirement, explicitly telling Congress that it was within its 
authority to authorize offensive measures.134 
One could plausibly argue that such a system would restrict the 
President’s ability to effectively prosecute a war initiated by another 
nation.135  Indeed, certain scholars have rejected the necessity of con-
gressional involvement of any sort when war is imposed upon the na-
tion.  John C. Yoo, in the context of the Barbary Wars, argued that 
“Presidents should not have to wait to seek authorization from Con-
gress when another nation has already attacked or declared war upon 
the United States.”136  This criticism of a deferential approach to 
Congress reflects Alexander Hamilton’s concern that the President 
would need to exercise the full might of the nation’s military to re-
spond to attack without restriction.137  This can be countered in two 
ways.  First, the nature and importance of the substantive policy im-
plications of extending a war to an offensive posture is the reason 
that the power was placed in the hands of Congress in the first 
place.138  Second, throughout the history of the nation, Congress has 
consistently acquiesced to a presidential request for authorization to 
use force when the nation has been attacked.139  Even dubious asser-
tions of foreign attacks on American troops abroad, such as the sup-
posed North Vietnamese attacks on American patrol boats in the Gulf 
of Tonkin in August of 1964, have led to congressional acquiescence 
for the use of force.140  If the President can effectively make a case 
that a foreign attack on the United States requires an offensive reac-
tion, he still has the ability to convince Congress of the legitimacy of 
 
133 As Saikrishna Prakash observed, “Whether Congress ultimately makes wise decisions or 
not, at least there is no obscure division of authority that might confuse the people.”  
Prakash, supra note 123, at 61. 
134 See supra text accompanying note 84. 
135 See Yoo, supra note 19, at 1683 (arguing that a strict structure requiring presidents to re-
ceive authorizations to use force would “seriously hamper” the nation’s efforts in combat-
ing enemies determined to attack the United States). 
136 YOO, supra note 94, at 114. 
137 See supra text accompanying note 39. 
138 See STORY, supra note 19, at 409–11 (discussing the Framers’ desire to place the decision 
of going to war with the legislature rather than the executive). 
139 E.g., FISHER, supra note 10. 
140 See ELY, supra note 131, at 20–21 (discussing circumstances surrounding the Tonkin Gulf 
Resolution). 
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that position.141  Further, the symbolic power of congressional ap-
proval of war can be essential to public confidence and approval.142  
Even Alexander Hamilton, who was among the foremost proponents 
of executive power in the years after the Constitutional Convention, 
recognized the symbolic importance of a congressional role in the 
decision to use force; as Kenneth B. Moss observed, “[a] congression-
al decision to use force or declare war was a check on executive pow-
er that Hamilton realized needed to be in place to ensure public con-
fidence and trust in the decision itself.”143  The question of whether 
war is desirable, as John Hart Ely observed, “is precisely what Con-
gress is supposed to decide.”144 
B.  Defining “Offensive” and “Defensive” War 
While the preceding analysis indicates that the President and 
Congress were meant to have varying authority in different types of 
war, one must attempt to clearly define offensive and defensive war.  
To categorize a war, one should look at the overall purpose and ob-
jectives of the military action.  Of course, all military campaigns re-
gardless of the goal require offensive and defensive actions; troops 
attacking a nation, for example, will still have to defend themselves 
from enemy counterattacks, and troops defending their nation 
against attack will ultimately undertake counteroffensives to drive the 
enemy from their territory and attempt to exploit the enemy’s weak-
ness at any opportunity.  These decisions belong with the executive 
branch because the President, as Commander in Chief, or his subor-
dinates in the military structure, must direct the day-to-day operation 
of the military.145  The point at which Congress should be required to 
step in should turn on the objective of the war itself.  This avoids the 
confusion that could result in involving Congress in minor aspects of 
 
141 See Prakash, supra note 123, at 60–61 (noting that a unitary war power in Congress “con-
centrates responsibility on Congress and thus does not permit confusion about who is re-
sponsible for going to war and who is accountable for the overall level of force being em-
ployed against the enemy”). 
142 LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 321 (2d ed. 
1996) (noting that “in foreign relations as elsewhere . . . the Congress is in several senses 
the more representative branch and brings to bear the influences of public opinion, di-
versity, concern for local and individual rights”). 
143 MOSS, supra note 65, at 26. 
144 ELY, supra note 131, at 100. 
145 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; see also Prakash, supra note 33, at 305 (noting that congres-
sional micromanagement of a war is implausible by observing that “a bill ordering a pla-
toon to capture a hill often will be rendered irrelevant by intervening events long before 
the bill becomes law and is conveyed to the platoon”). 
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a conflict, but preserves the policy-making role that the Framers orig-
inally meant for Congress to have in the realm of war.146 
The two extremes of offensive and defensive war are fairly easy to 
define.  A purely defensive war would include situations such as repel-
ling a direct invasion or responding to an attack on American soil; 
here, the President would have significant power to respond without 
congressional approval.  Thomas Jefferson expressed this view 
throughout his presidency; as Louis Fisher observed, “[f]or purely de-
fensive operations, Jefferson retained the right to act first and seek 
congressional approval later.”147  For example, when a British vessel 
fired on the American ship Chesapeake off the American coast in June 
1807, war between the United States and Britain appeared immi-
nent.148  President Jefferson approved a number of military expendi-
tures to strengthen military installations in coastal cities, claiming his 
orders were justified by “the emergencies threatening us.”149  This re-
sponse was an appropriate unilateral presidential response in the 
context of defensive war, reflected by the overwhelming support Jef-
ferson received for his actions in Congress; when the House of Rep-
resentatives voted to retroactively fund Jefferson’s defensive measures 
after it reconvened in November 1807, the measure passed by an 
overwhelming vote of 124-2.150 
At the other end of the spectrum, a purely offensive war would in-
clude an initiation of hostilities against a nation without provocation.  
This is the only scenario where the Constitution gives explicit instruc-
tions:  it is Congress who should declare war.151  Further reflecting the 
limited power of the President to “repel sudden attack,” the “decision 
to engage the nation in offensive hostilities” lies with Congress.152 
The most difficult task is determining which branch must act in 
situations that fall between these two concrete examples.153  The first 
scenario is when a war that started defensively takes on an offensive 
character.  This could take place, for example, when the United 
States or an ally is attacked and the President defensively responds to 
the attack.  However, defeating the enemy often does not mean just 
repulsing him from friendly territory and can often include attacks 
 
146 WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 55, at 70. 
147 FISHER, supra note 10, at 36. 
148 SOFAER, supra note 37, at 172. 
149 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
150 Id. at 173. 
151 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . to declare War . . . .”). 
152 KEYNES, supra note 11, at 38. 
153 See id. at 40 (noting that “there is no clear-cut distinction between defensive and offensive 
warfare”). 
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on his territory to help disable the enemy’s military capabilities.  In 
this scenario, congressional approval should be required when the 
war’s objectives change from inherently defensive to inherently of-
fensive.  In many recent American wars, the involvement of the Unit-
ed States was not defending itself but acting as an ally, such as in Ko-
rea or Vietnam.154  In these situations, Congress should have a role in 
deciding whether to change the objective from defending the ally to 
attacking the enemy, largely because of the policy implications of this 
move.155  As mentioned earlier, the Framers meant for Congress to be 
the policy-making branch in terms of war.156  Historical experience 
shows that unilateral presidential actions in the context of wars being 
fought defensively have had massive policy implications; congression-
al consideration and approval therefore must be sought for these ac-
tions.  Two fairly recent examples are instructive.  In 1950, without 
congressional approval, President Truman decided to occupy the en-
tire Korean peninsula rather than simply defend the territorial inte-
grity of South Korea after an invasion by North Korea.157  This action 
led to intervention by China and resulted in several years of stale-
mated war and thousands of American casualties.158  In 1969 and 
1970, President Nixon secretly decided to undertake a massive bomb-
ing campaign and later ground invasion of Cambodia, which was ar-
guably beyond the scope of the war in Vietnam, whose objective was 
to defend South Vietnam.159  While a small number of members of 
Congress were notified, Congress as a whole was not consulted, even 
though this was an escalation of combat operations to an entirely dif-
ferent country.160  The fact that these unilateral presidential decisions 
 
154 These are situations that the Framers may not have contemplated, as their conceptions of 
national defense shortly after independence were most likely geographically limited to 
territorial integrity and would not extend to the vast network of allies and national securi-
ty interests possessed by the United States around the globe today.  Id. at 39. 
155 Id. at 38. 
156 See supra text accompanying note 122. 
157 See infra text accompanying notes 194–201. 
158 See infra Part IV.A (discussing the implications of President Truman’s decision to go on 
the offensive into North Korea during the Korean War). 
159 ELY, supra note 131, at 98; see also infra Part IV.B. 
160 See ELY, supra note 131, at 98 (“Although a small handful of cooperative members of 
Congress—I make it eight—apparently were told, those the administration subsequently 
identified understandably tended to belittle the extent of their notification, and in any 
event they did not pass the word along to their colleagues or the American people.”  (ci-
tations omitted)).  Although the circumstances of the conflicts are quite different, the in-
teraction of the executive and legislative branches regarding the military action in Cam-
bodia has some parallels to the Obama administration’s recent decision to intervene 
militarily in Libya.  In the latter situation, President Obama notified certain members of 
Congress about his decision to order a bombing campaign against government forces in 
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produced serious complications exemplify why this power was placed 
with Congress.  Decisions of such magnitude were not meant for the 
President to make alone; their importance was the reason that the 
Framers meant for Congress to make, or at least approve of, these de-
cisions.161  Under these circumstances, the President must seek at least 
a congressional authorization for inherently offensive actions. 
An examination of two modern examples can help clarify the dif-
ference between offensive and defensive war in more ambiguous situ-
ations.  In the wake of the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 
August 1990, President George H.W. Bush, acting in the wake of a 
number of United Nations resolutions,162 prompted a build-up of 
American and allied military forces in Saudi Arabia in preparation to 
expel the Iraqi Army from Kuwait.163  Congress voted on and autho-
rized the use of force against Iraq in January of 1991.164  American 
forces and their allies later attacked the Iraqi forces, but did not go 
beyond the established objective of expelling the Iraqis from Ku-
wait.165  While this scenario is complicated because it involves Ameri-
can forces acting in defense of another nation,166 President Bush 
acted properly in this scenario.  Because he wisely gained congres-
sional approval for this action,167 President Bush did not have any 
 
Libya several days in advance of the beginning of military operations, but did not bring 
the matter to Congress as a whole for authorization.  See Press Gaggle, Jay Carney, Press 
Sec’y, The White House (Mar. 24, 2011) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2011/03/24/press-gaggle-press-secretary-jay-carney-3242011 (discussing 
meetings between Obama administration officials and members of Congress and actions 
by Congress prior to military intervention in Libya). 
161 See ELY, supra note 131, at 100 (“A fear that Congress might overturn (or complain about) 
executive policy is not a constitutional excuse for not telling it what’s going on.”) 
162 JOHN LEHMAN, MAKING WAR:  THE 200-YEAR-OLD BATTLE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND 
CONGRESS OVER HOW AMERICA GOES TO WAR 21–22 (1992). 
163 Id. at 33–34; SEAN WILENTZ, THE AGE OF REAGAN:  A HISTORY, 1974–2008 at 296–99. 
164 Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No. 102–1, 105 
Stat. 3 (1991).  Notably, the votes in the House and Senate that ultimately authorized the 
action were fairly close:  250 to 183 in the House, and 52 to 47 in the Senate.  WILENTZ, 
supra note 163, at 300. 
165 See WILENTZ, supra note 163, at 301–02 (noting that “the removal of Saddam [Hussein] 
had simply never been a stated goal for Bush or the United Nations”). 
166 As discussed later in this article, although the broader objective was inherently defensive, 
because there was no attack on the United States, the decision to use military force 
against Iraq was a decision that implicated Congress’s decision and policy-making powers.  
Indeed, because Iraq’s offensive action was not against the United States but another na-
tion that the United States had no obligation to defend, a declaration of war would have 
been appropriate.  See infra Part IV.C.  However, for the purposes of this Part, the factual 
scenario demonstrates an inherently defensive war in which the President did not go 
beyond its authorized defensive objective. 
167 See WILENTZ, supra note 163, at 300 (discussing members of the Bush administration’s 
concerns about congressional involvement in the decision to go to war against Iraq in 
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constitutional problem.  However, if President Bush actually changed 
the objective from liberating Kuwait, which would be inherently de-
fensive as it would be expelling an offensive invasion, to invading Iraq 
and toppling the offending government or occupying the country, 
the nature of the war would have shifted from defensive in nature to 
offensive in nature.  Under this framework, President Bush would 
have required congressional approval for his actions, as it implicates 
the policy-making authority of Congress.  A situation similar to this 
hypothetical scenario took place in 1950, when President Truman 
began by acting in defense of South Korea when it was invaded by 
North Korea.168  The defensive objective of defending South Korea, 
under this framework, is within the President’s power.  However, af-
ter American forces expelled the North Korean army from South Ko-
rean soil, Truman went beyond his rightful authority by changing the 
objective from defensive (defending South Korea) to offensive (oc-
cupying North Korea).169  Here, President Truman overstepped his 
bounds and should have sought congressional authorization for his 
actions.170 
The President may have more extensive authority to react offen-
sively if the attack is on the United States itself, rather than an ally.171  
This has become more relevant in the past decade, as American in-
terests were attacked by the foreign terrorist organization al Qaeda in 
1998 and 2000,172 followed by a major terrorist attack on American 
soil on September 11, 2001.173  President George W. Bush responded 
to this attack with an attack on al Qaeda and Afghanistan, which har-
bored the organization.  The invasion of Afghanistan fell within the 
bounds of the President’s authority to respond, as its purpose was to 
destroy al Qaeda’s capability to strike the United States once again.174  
Importantly, President Bush did not act unconstitutionally under this 
Article’s framework because Congress authorized the use of military 
 
1991, but that President Bush had decided that “political prudence had demanded that 
he watch Congress go through with a vote anyway”). 
168 See infra Part IV.A. 
169 Id. 
170 Id.  The constitutional questions regarding President Truman’s actions are more fully 
discussed in Part IV.A. 
171 See KEYNES, supra note 11, at 39 (noting the Framers’ original ideas of defense were li-
mited to expectations of attacks on American soil). 
172 See WILENTZ, supra note 163, at 393–94, 406 (discussing al Qaeda attacks on American 
embassies in Africa in 1998 and the USS Cole in 2000). 
173 Id. at 432–33 (discussing the after-effects of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade 
Center). 
174 The constitutional questions surrounding the invasion of Afghanistan are more fully dis-
cussed in Part IV.D. 
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force shortly after the attacks.175  Hypothetically, had President Bush 
not obtained this authority, he may have been able to respond under 
his defensive authority as President by disabling al Qaeda’s ability to 
attack the United States again, and this would involve attacking al 
Qaeda training camps and strongholds in Afghanistan.  However, if it 
was clear that the objective of the war was to oust the Taliban gov-
ernment of Afghanistan and occupy the nation, this would have acti-
vated Congress’s policy-making authority, and would have required 
congressional approval.  Because Congress passed the Authorization 
to Use Military Force,176 however, this potential difficulty did not arise. 
Recently, the United States has adopted a policy where the United 
States initiates hostilities but asserts a defensive reason for doing so.  
This policy, known as preemptive war, was adopted by President 
George W. Bush in advance of the American invasion of Iraq in 
2003.177  Its goal was to attack enemies of the United States before 
they have the capability to strike the United States.178  However, the 
key feature of this policy for constitutional purposes is that, regardless 
of the justification, the United States initiates hostilities.  Therefore, 
the use of preemptive war should be considered offensive war.  The 
decision to engage in preemptive war should rest with Congress for 
two reasons.  First, initiating hostilities is the only kind of warfare 
where the Constitution gives explicit instructions on who shall make 
that decision; Article I, Section 8 specifically instructs that Congress 
shall issue a declaration of war in this situation.179  Congress must ful-
fill its specifically defined role when the nation is to initiate hostilities 
and declare war.  Second, because the ultimate policy-making author-
ity for war was meant to rest with Congress, this decision to initiate 
war is exactly the kind of authority that Congress must exercise.180 
The power of the President and Congress in war, based on early 
experience, seems to be a sliding scale.  At one end would be purely 
offensive warfare; in this area, Congress has the most control.  At the 
other end is purely defensive warfare; here, the President has the 
ability to respond without the consent or authorization of Congress.  
In the vast middle of these two extremes, however, the most effective 
way to determine who has the proper authority is to look at the over-
all objectives of the campaign.  Congress was meant to have a broad 
 
175 See infra text accompanying note 241. 
176 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107–40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
177 See infra Part IV.E. 
178 Id. 
179 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
180 See supra text accompanying notes 121–29. 
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say in the war power, and this should specifically be invoked whenev-
er a campaign becomes offensive in nature.  No matter what the ini-
tial nature of a conflict is, however, the President would be wise to 
gain congressional authorization at the earliest opportunity to avoid 
constitutional problems under this framework.  However, as a policy 
of initiating preemptive war has emerged in the United States, the 
need has emerged for Congress to take its strongest possible action, 
as instructed by the Constitution. 
IV.  THE BARBARY FRAMEWORK AND MODERN UNDECLARED WARS 
The power of the President in matters of war dramatically ex-
panded throughout the 19th and 20th centuries.  During the Ameri-
can Civil War, perhaps the most perilous time for the security and 
survival of the United States, President Lincoln undertook perhaps 
the greatest assertion of executive power to that point in the nation’s 
history.  Without the consent of Congress, President Lincoln sus-
pended habeas corpus, raised armies, and imposed a blockade on the 
rebellious southern states.181  While he was ultimately justified in most 
of his actions, either by the Supreme Court182 or retroactively by Con-
gress,183 his actions marked a dramatic expansion of executive pow-
er.184  By 1929, Charles Warren, commenting on the decision of the 
Constitutional Convention to place the power to declare war with 
Congress, wrote, “[i]n recent years, Congress has acquiesced in the 
assumption by the President” of the power given to Congress to dec-
lare war.185  However, the key period for the expansion of presidential 
power over matters of war was the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt.  
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s recognition of sweeping execu-
tive authority in the realm of foreign affairs in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp.,186 President Roosevelt frequently acted unilaterally 
 
181 DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 17–18 (2003). 
182 See, e.g., The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. 635 (1863) (approving Presi-
dent Lincoln’s decision to impose a blockade on the rebelling southern states without 
congressional approval). 
183 See Act of Aug. 6, 1861, ch. 63, 12 Stat. 326. 
184 See J.G. RANDALL, LINCOLN 123 (1947) (“No president has carried the power of presiden-
tial edict and executive order (independently of Congress) so far as . . . [Lincoln] did.”), 
cited in Frank J. Williams, Nicole J. Dulude & Kimberly A. Tracey, Still a Frightening Un-
known:  Achieving a Constitutional Balance Between Civil Liberties and National Security During 
the War on Terror, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 675, 746 n.470 (2007). 
185 WARREN, supra note 13, at 481. 
186 299 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1936) (noting the role of the President as the “constitutional rep-
resentative of the United States with regard to foreign nations” and recognizing the im-
portant and perhaps predominant role of the President in foreign affairs);  see also Roy E. 
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in the years leading up to World War II, including ordering ex-
panded U.S. naval patrols in the war-ravaged Pacific and transferring 
American military equipment to Great Britain without the consent of 
Congress.187  At the time President Harry Truman assumed office in 
1945, the President had become the predominant actor in terms of 
the war power.188 
This brief sketch of the changing nature of the balance of war 
powers between the President and Congress is helpful in discussing 
the United States’ wars since 1945, in which the role of the President 
expanded significantly.189  At the time of this writing, the congres-
sional declaration of war seems to have faded into irrelevance.  The 
wars of the latter half of the 20th century and the first decade of the 
21st century have all been conducted without a formal congressional 
declaration of war.  The framework discussed in Part III can be used 
to determine whether actions of the President and Congress regard-
ing these undeclared wars would be acceptable under the original 
views of the war-making power.  This Part applies the aforementioned 
framework to the most prominent undeclared wars of the last sixty 
years:  the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf War, the 
invasion of Afghanistan, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003.  Each of 
these conflicts presents a different factual scenario with different le-
vels of congressional involvement and presidential acquiescence to 
congressional guidance.  Ultimately, the recent undeclared war in 
Iraq presented a scenario where a declaration of war was called for 
under the Barbary framework’s interpretation of the original under-
standing of the war powers of Congress and the President. 
A.  The Korean War:  Defensive War to Offensive War Without Authorization 
With the expansion of the role of the United States in interna-
tional affairs after World War II, and with the recognition that the 
United States was one of the only world powers with the ability and 
strength to defend other nations and keep the peace, the war-making 
 
Brownell II, The Coexistence of United States v. Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube v. Sawyer in National Security Jurisprudence, 16 J.L. & POL. 1, 8 (2000) (noting that 
Curtiss Wright “has become the lodestar for advocates of Executive preeminence in na-
tional security affairs”). 
187 FISHER, supra note 10, at 76–77, 79. 
188 Cf. id. at 80 (observing that many of the war powers that the President had obtained dur-
ing World War II were not relinquished after the war’s conclusion). 
189 For a more in depth analysis of the historical trends surrounding the expansion of execu-
tive war power from the nation’s early conflicts, including the Barbary Wars, to the be-
ginning of the Cold War, see HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
CONSTITUTION:  SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 74–100 (1990). 
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power continued to heavily shift away from Congress and towards the 
President.190  American national security concerns were no longer li-
mited to American territory; after 1945, the United States found its 
national security interests heavily expanded to include a vast global 
network of allies and national security interests.191  Centralized presi-
dential control of this network, and the intertwining of military issues 
with the foreign affairs power (traditionally within the realm of the 
President),192 helped shift the war power heavily towards the executive 
branch. 
The undeclared Korean War further emphasized this trend.  After 
World War II, the United States backed the non-communist govern-
ment of South Korea with diplomatic and economic support, but 
withdrew its military forces from South Korea in 1949.193  On June 25, 
1950, the communist forces of North Korea invaded South Korea, 
and American troops swiftly became involved in the conflict.194  With-
in two days, President Truman, without the consent of Congress, 
committed American troops to South Korea’s defense.195  In the first 
few months of the war, North Korean troops drove American, South 
Korean, and other international forces to the tip of the South Korean 
peninsula around Pusan.196  In September 1950, the United States 
launched a successful counteroffensive, backed by an amphibious 
landing in occupied South Korean territory.197  The counteroffensive 
eventually crossed the 38th parallel, which demarcated the border 
between South and North Korea, and eventually came close to occu-
pying the entire peninsula.198  As the American-led offensive ap-
proached the border with China, Chinese forces intervened on be-
half of their North Korean allies and swarmed across the border, 
 
190 See MOSS, supra note 65, at 73 (“The constitutional balance between Congress and presi-
dent in war was irrevocably changed after the peace ending World War II in 1945.”). 
191 See KEYNES, supra note 11, at 39 (“By the mid-1960s, the United States had entered into 
bilateral and multilateral agreements with forty-two other nations, which represented a 
minimum commitment to consult with these nations in the event of an attack or threat to 
their security.”). 
192 See generally United States. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (asserting 
the dominant role of the President in foreign relations). 
193 Russell D. Buhite, “Major Interests”:  American Policy Toward China, Taiwan, and Korea, 
1945–1950, 47 PAC. HIST. REV. 425, 449 (1978). 
194 PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES:  WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF HISTORY 52 
(2002). 
195 Fisher, supra note 52, at 33. 
196 BOBBITT, supra note 194, at 52. 
197 Howard S. Levie, How It All Started–And How It Ended:  A Legal Study of the Korean War, 35 
AKRON L. REV. 205, 221 (2002). 
198 BOBBITT, supra note 194, at 52. 
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catching American forces off guard and overstretched.199  The result 
was a rout of American troops and a retreat closer to the original 
border between the two Korean nations at the 38th parallel.200  A sta-
lemate ensued until a cease-fire was signed in 1953, with Korea still 
divided at close to its original border.201 
To analyze the Korean War under the framework laid out earlier 
in this article, the conflict must be considered in two stages.  The first 
stage involved the President’s immediate reaction to the North Ko-
rean invasion by sending troops and conducting military operations 
without congressional approval.  Whether this action was justifiable 
under the Barbary framework depends on whether President Truman 
was in fact reacting to a sudden attack on the United States.  There 
were no American military units stationed in South Korea, the United 
States having withdrawn its forces from the nation in 1949.202  Howev-
er, the United States was backing the South Korean government as 
part of the new global role of the United States of supporting many 
non-communist nations early in the Cold War.203  The President’s de-
cision to commit troops without consulting Congress was controver-
sial; after all, only American interests were attacked, not American 
territory, civilians, or troops.  Some argue that President Truman’s 
actions were justified by a broad presidential authority to act in a time 
of crisis or emergency, including coming to the defense of American 
allies or interests.204  Other scholars, most prominently Louis Fisher, 
argue that the initial commitment of troops in defense of South Ko-
rea itself was unconstitutional because Congress did not authorize 
this action.205  John Norton Moore argues that, while President Tru-
man should have had the authority to act in response to the North 
Korean attack, he should have immediately sought congressional au-
 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202 See supra text accompanying note 193. 
203 See supra note 191 (noting expanded American military commitments in the years after 
World War II). 
204 See, e.g., John Norton Moore, Emergency War Powers, in THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE 
POWER TO GO TO WAR 158, 165 (Gary M. Stern & Morton H. Halperin eds., 1994) 
(“Whatever the competing approaches to the underlying general war powers, there is 
broad support, although not unanimous in all settings, for presidential authority in 
emergency settings to respond to aggressive attacks against the United States, its interests, 
allies, forces, or citizens, whether at home or abroad, and whether low-level or high-level 
force is required to repel the attack.”) 
205 See generally Fisher, supra note 52, at 37 (concluding that President Truman’s unilateral 
action against Korea violated the Constitution and is “not valid precedent for what Presi-
dent Bush planned” in his attacks against Iraq). 
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thorization.206  Whether President Truman’s initial reaction to this 
situation, which was an emergency of a sudden attack facing an 
American ally and which he defended as acting in defense of South 
Korea, without the consent of Congress, is indeed debatable.207  Even 
Fisher conceded that President Truman’s use of force may have been 
justifiable based on his formulation on when unilateral presidential 
action in an emergency may be acceptable:  “a President may act 
without congressional authority (and without express legal or consti-
tutional authority), trusting that the circumstances are so urgent and 
compelling that Congress will endorse his actions and confer a legi-
timacy that only Congress . . . can provide.”208  Despite Truman’s fail-
ure to seek either immediate or retroactive congressional authoriza-
tion (a decision Fisher focused his criticism upon),209 it seems that 
President Truman’s commitment of forces was at least partially con-
sistent with Fisher’s idea of acceptable constitutional unilateral presi-
dential action.  As John C. Yoo notes, there was substantial support 
for Truman’s actions in Congress at the time of the North Korean at-
tack, but Truman simply did not seek explicit congressional approv-
al.210  Nonetheless, Fisher’s analysis does not adequately take into ac-
count the President’s authority to repel a sudden attack.  As 
established above, the President can act defensively in the face of at-
tack.  Undertaking an analysis of whether Congress would approve of 
his action would be both speculative of Congress’s intent and difficult 
for the President to determine if his actions would be Constitutionally 
sound.  Instead, a divide between pure presidential authority to act 
defensively, without congressional consent, and a need for congres-
sional authority for offensive operations would allow the President to 
 
206 John N. Moore, The National Executive and the Use of Armed Forces Abroad, 21 NAVAL WAR C. 
REV. 28, 32 (1969). 
207 John Hart Ely, for example, wrote that the Truman administration’s justification for in-
tervening in Korea of acting in defense of South Korea was “at least initially true, but con-
stitutionally irrelevant.”  ELY, supra note 131, at 11. 
208 FISHER, supra note 10, at 100. 
209 Id. 
210 See John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means:  The Original Understanding of 
War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 178 (1996) (“President Truman immediately commit-
ted American military forces without seeking Congressional approval, even though sub-
stantial support existed in Congress for the President’s unilateral decision.  Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson and Senate Majority Leader Scott Lucas both convinced Truman to 
rely on his Commander-in-Chief powers to support his actions, which led the President to 
refrain from seeking the congressional authorization he could have obtained easily.”).  
Yoo also noted that Congress seemed to implicitly authorize President Truman’s actions 
by passing appropriations bills and draft extensions in support of the war effort.  Id. 
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act more freely when necessary but defer to Congress for the decision 
of expanding the war. 
Therefore, more important for the purposes of the original con-
stitutional framework was the second unique factor about the Ameri-
can involvement in Korea:  President Truman authorized the military 
to go from defensive to offensive war without congressional approval.  
It is at this point that an analysis of whether the President has the 
proper authority to take action is of the greatest importance under 
this framework; not necessarily at the immediate inception of war, 
but when the inherent character of the war changes from defensive 
to offensive.  Thus, President Truman’s decision to order forces 
across the 38th parallel with the intent of unifying the Korean penin-
sula did not comply with this article’s framework reflecting the origi-
nal understanding of the Constitution’s conception of presidential 
use of defensive force.  Assuming that President Truman was acting 
in a genuine emergency that triggered his power to react defensively 
to sudden attack,211 he only had the authority under the Barbary 
framework to fulfill the defensive nature of his actions.  This would 
include driving North Korean forces from South Korean territory, 
which is analogous to American naval ships defending their country-
men’s vessels during the conflict with Tripoli in 1801 but declining to 
act offensively against the Tripolitan fleet, ports, and mainland with-
out congressional consent.212  The moment American forces crossed 
the 38th parallel with the intention of occupying North Korea, the 
war changed from defensive to offensive.  Congressional authoriza-
tion was therefore needed at this point.  President Truman’s decision 
to shift the war from a defensive to an offensive nature was not his to 
make; that decision rightfully belonged to Congress. 
The consequences of the American invasion of North Korea dem-
onstrated the importance of congressional involvement in decisions 
regarding offensive warfare.  While it is impossible to determine what 
would have happened had the United States maintained its defensive 
posture and stopped at the border between the two Korean states, the 
American invasion of North Korea resulted in the serious conse-
quences of a military defeat in North Korea, Chinese intervention on 
the side of the North Koreans, and two more years of warfare and 
mounting casualties.213  The unfortunate consequences of President 
 
211 See supra text accompanying notes 204–08. 
212 See supra text accompanying notes 73–89. 
213 See BOBBITT, supra note 194, at 52 (discussing the implications of the American counte-
rinvasion of North Korea, including Chinese intervention and a lengthy, bloody stale-
mate). 
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Truman’s unilateral exertion of offensive war reflect James Madison’s 
concerns as “Helvidius” that the power to conduct war and the power 
to decide its scope in terms of when it should begin, continue, or end 
must reside in separate branches.214  Indeed, President Truman’s de-
cision to cross into North Korea had major substantive implications 
beyond merely directing the conduct of the war; it triggered a host of 
new concerns, including potentially occupying and defending North 
Korea and risking expanding the war to involve China and the Soviet 
Union.215  Such a momentous decision was meant by the Framers to 
rest with Congress, not the President. 
B.  The Vietnam War:  Authorizing a Defensive Objective 
The United States’ role in the Vietnam War, as authorized by 
Congress, was ostensibly defensive in nature; however, the presiden-
tial interpretation of Congress’s authorization involved more contro-
versial initiatives.  The United States’ military presence in Vietnam 
was initially advisory, logistically supporting and training the South 
Vietnamese military in their efforts to stamp out a communist insur-
gency.216  Although thousands of American troops were already 
present in Vietnam, the turning point of American involvement in 
the conflict took place in August of 1964, when North Vietnamese 
torpedo boats attacked American ships in the Tonkin Gulf.217  Presi-
dent Lyndon Johnson subsequently sought congressional authoriza-
tion to escalate American involvement in the conflict.218  On August 7, 
1964, Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which read in 
part “[t]hat the Congress approves and supports the determination 
of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary meas-
ures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States 
and to prevent further aggression.”219  This authorization appears va-
guely worded, but the message appears clear that Congress autho-
rized the use of force “to repel any armed attack” or “to prevent fur-
 
214 MORGAN, supra note 42, at 100; see also text accompanying notes 43–45. 
215 Supra note 213. 
216 See JAMES E. WESTHEIDER, THE VIETNAM WAR 10–11 (2007) (discussing the increase in the 
number of American troops in Vietnam from 1961 to 1963); see also ELY, supra note 131, 
at 13 (same). 
217 KOH, supra note 189, at 38 (describing the attack on American ships by North Vietnamese 
torpedo boats in the Tonkin Gulf and America’s response). 
218 Id. at 38–39 (“President Johnson . . . asked Congress for the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, a 
joint resolution of support that he subsequently construed as broad congressional autho-
rization to escalate the Vietnam War.”). 
219 Tonkin Gulf Resolution of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–408, 78 Stat. 384. 
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ther aggression.”220  Therefore, it appears that Congress did not au-
thorize any military action beyond defending American forces in 
South Vietnam and countering North Vietnamese aggression.221  Ac-
cordingly, despite the controversies surrounding American involve-
ment in Vietnam, the use of military force for the defense of South 
Vietnam did not deviate from the Barbary framework of constitution-
al requirements.222  However, during this conflict, Presidents Johnson 
and Nixon expanded the war beyond the borders of both North and 
South Vietnam, largely through bombing campaigns.  Most noto-
riously, President Nixon ordered an incursion into Cambodia in 1970 
aimed at disrupting the flow of supplies and manpower to communist 
forces in South Vietnam.223  It can certainly be argued that the goal of 
these actions was consistent with the broad congressionally autho-
rized objective of defending South Vietnam.224  However, the ultimate 
result of these actions was the expansion of the war from a national 
conflict aimed at North Vietnam to a regional one involving opera-
tions in multiple nations, which certainly implicates the policy-
making authority of Congress.225  At the very least, prior to expanding 
the scope of the war, Congress should have been consulted and con-
vinced to authorize the expansion, which would have more appro-
 
220 Id. 
221 See MOSS, supra note 65, at 87 (“Strategically, the war’s objective was not so much to de-
feat North Vietnam and absorb it into South Vietnam, but to coerce North Vietnam to 
accept South Vietnam . . . .”). 
222 Even John Hart Ely, who harshly criticized Congress’s failure to fulfill its constitutional 
obligations in authorizing the use of force, noted that Congress did act appropriately in 
giving its authorization to the President.  ELY, supra note 131, at 12.  Kenneth B. Moss, 
reaching the same conclusion, noted that “[j]ust because legislation is poorly considered 
and approved does not invalidate it.”  MOSS, supra note 65, at 86. 
223 See John Norton Moore, Legal Dimensions of the Decision to Intercede in Cambodia, 65 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 38, 44 (1971) (noting the “repeated United States protests against North Viet-
namese and Viet Cong use of neutral Cambodian territory” in the period leading up to 
the American offensive into Cambodia); R.B. Smith, The International Setting of the Cambo-
dia Crisis, 1969–70, 18 INT’L HIST. REV. 303, 315, 318–19 (1996) (describing American 
concerns about supplies directed toward Communist forces through Cambodia in 1969 
and 1970). 
224 See ELY, supra note 131, at 32 (arguing that the terms of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution au-
thorized the President to conduct military operations in Cambodia as part of its defense 
of South Vietnam). 
225 See Jules Lobel, Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress:  Concurrent Power over 
the Conduct of War, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 391, 404 (2008) (countering arguments that the ex-
pansion of the war into Cambodia was solely within the power of the President by noting 
that “such a use of American military power clearly reflected a major policy decision that 
escalated the conflict into other sovereign states and had important effects and conse-
quences for U.S. foreign policy”). 
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priately deferred to Congress’s intended policy-making role.226  Per-
haps most importantly, however, the American experience in Viet-
nam reinforces the need for clear guidance from Congress.  As Ha-
rold Hongju Koh noted, President Johnson construed the Tonkin 
Gulf Resolution as “broad congressional authorization to escalate the 
Vietnam War.”227  A more specific authorization from Congress, clear-
ly laying out the defensive objectives and permissible scope of the 
war, may have allowed the legislative branch to better implement its 
policy-making authority in terms of the war powers, and could have 
impacted the scope of the American military effort.228 
C.  The Persian Gulf War:  Offensive War with a Defensive Objective 
The Persian Gulf War saw the United States involved in a broader 
conflict that was not initiated by the United States; rather, an aggres-
sor attacked another nation and the United States intervened to libe-
rate that nation.  In August 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait, 
which prompted international condemnation and a build-up of in-
ternational forces, led by the United States, in neighboring Saudi 
Arabia.229  In January 1991, Congress authorized the President to use 
military force against Iraq to expel its forces from Kuwait.230  Impor-
tantly, the congressional authorization was tailored as a response to 
Iraq’s offensive operations against Kuwait and specifically noted that 
force was authorized “to achieve implementation” of United Nations 
Security Council resolutions, all of which condemned the Iraqi inva-
 
226 See Wormuth, supra note 27, at 651–52 (criticizing the Cambodian incursion as beyond 
the President’s authority to repel sudden attacks).  Congress only addressed the Cambo-
dian incursion after it took place, passing legislation in 1971 forbidding the introduction 
of U.S. ground combat troops or advisers in Cambodia.  Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 
91–672, § 12, 84 Stat. 2053, 2055.  Notably, this resolution did not mention aerial bomb-
ing, which was undertaken in theaters beyond South Vietnam until the end of the war. 
227 KOH, supra note 189, at 39. 
228 The Vietnam War is distinguishable from the other conflicts discussed in this Part be-
cause, rather than responding to a foreign power’s sudden action against the United 
States, an ally, or another nation, the United States gradually committed military forces to 
an ally that was already facing an internal and external military threat.  Harold Hongju 
Koh tellingly characterized Vietnam as an “undeclared creeping war[]” that started and 
built “before Congress . . . [and] the public . . . [were] fully aware.”  Id.  It is therefore dif-
ficult to analyze this conflict under the Barbary framework, which contemplates direct at-
tacks on the United States, or an ally in some cases.  This Part’s analysis therefore only 
discusses the broader policy and inherent defensive nature of the Vietnam War and 
comments upon its expansion to other nations without Congress’s explicit authorization. 
229 OREN, supra note 64, at 563–65 (discussing the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait); see also LEHMAN, 
supra note 162, at 52–53 (describing the U.S. attacks against Iraq). 
230 Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No. 102–1, § 2, 
105 Stat. 3 (1991). 
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sion and demanded Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.231  Following Con-
gress’s authorization, President George H.W. Bush ordered a lengthy 
air campaign, which was followed with an American-led attack on Iraq 
that liberated Kuwait from the Iraqi military within a matter of days.232  
Although the operation reached southern Iraqi territory as part of its 
rout of the Iraqi military, President Bush ceased military operations 
upon the accomplishment of the objective of defeating the Iraqi mili-
tary and liberating Kuwait, and did not go beyond the inherently de-
fensive objective of repulsing an attack on another nation.233 
The Persian Gulf War presents an important distinction from pre-
vious (at least initially) inherently defensive wars such as Korea and 
Vietnam.  Kuwait, unlike South Korea and South Vietnam, was not an 
American ally with an American military presence when it was at-
tacked by Iraq.  Therefore, because there was no attack on the United 
States or American interests, there remains a question of whether a 
congressional declaration of war was necessary.  Michael Ramsey ar-
gued that the Persian Gulf War was not inherently defensive because 
no state of war existed between the United States and Iraq before the 
beginning of Operation Desert Storm.234  Indeed, in this situation, the 
United States initiated a conflict against another nation that had not 
attacked the United States, and, therefore, a declaration of war would 
have been appropriate in this situation.235 
However, although the method used to authorize the military ac-
tion against Iraq may not have been proper in this situation, the Per-
sian Gulf War is an effective example of the President conducting a 
war with a defensive objective within the bounds set by Congress.  In 
this scenario, the actions of Congress and the President in the Persian 
Gulf War were consistent with the proper placement of policy-making 
authority under the Barbary framework.  The President sought au-
thorization for military action limited to a specific, defensive objec-
 
231 Id. (referencing twelve United Nations Security Council Resolutions passed between Au-
gust and November of 1990 condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait). 
232 OREN, supra note 64, at 566–67. 
233 See id. at 567–68 (discussing President Bush’s decision to halt military operations before 
toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime and occupying Iraq).  Unlike in the Korean War, in 
which the United States sought to occupy and unify the entire Korean peninsula, the 
United States did not advance into Iraqi territory with the intent of occupying that na-
tion; instead, American motives were limited to defeating the Iraqi military and expelling 
it from Kuwait.  See supra text accompanying note 212. 
234 Ramsey, supra note 39, at 1628. 
235 See J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27, 31–33 (1991) (describing the events 
surrounding and leading up to the Persian Gulf War, and concluding that due to the 
failure of Congress to declare war against Iraq, the war “lacked constitutional legitimacy 
despite its overwhelming support among the American electorate”). 
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tive:  liberating a nation who had been attacked.  Congress approved 
of this proposed use of force, which did not expand beyond a defen-
sive objective.  Because the war was not expanded to an offensive ob-
jective, no further congressional authorization was needed. 
Additionally, it is important to distinguish the objectives of the 
United States in its conflict with Iraq in 1991 as opposed to its conflict 
with the same nation in 2003.  In the Persian Gulf War, the United 
States did not initiate the broader conflict, and went to war with the 
inherently defensive motive of expelling an aggressor from an occu-
pied nation.  By contrast, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which was based 
upon the premise of preemptive war, was conducted with an inhe-
rently offensive objective.236  Therefore, although a declaration of war 
may have been an appropriate method of authorizing military force 
during the Persian Gulf War, the circumstances of the American inva-
sion of Iraq in 2003 highlight the necessity for Congress to undertake 
its strongest possible action of declaring war when the nature of the 
American objectives is inherently offensive.237 
D.  The Invasion of Afghanistan:  Authorizing an Offensive Response 
The events leading up to the invasion of Afghanistan provide per-
haps the clearest example of following the Barbary framework for the 
President and Congress’s roles in war.  On September 11, 2001, the 
United States was directly attacked by terrorists in New York, Wash-
ington, D.C., and Pennsylvania.238  Individuals affiliated with an inter-
national terrorist group known as al Qaeda hijacked planes and 
crashed them into civilian targets, the Twin Towers in New York, and 
a military target, the Pentagon, in Washington; a fourth plane 
crashed in rural Pennsylvania.239 
One week after the attacks, on September 18, 2001, Congress 
passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists 
[hereinafter AUMF].240  Section 2 of the AUMF declared: 
(a) IN GENERAL—That the President is authorized to use all necessary 
and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he 
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist at-
tacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organiza-
 
236 See infra Part IV.E. 
237 See infra text accompanying notes 257–58. 
238 Michael Grunwald, Terrorists Hijack 4 Airliners, 2 Destroy World Trade Center, Hit Pentagon; 
Hundreds Dead; Bush Promises Retribution; Military Put on Highest Alert, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 
2001, at A1. 
239 Id. 
240 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107–40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
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tions or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international ter-
rorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or per-
sons.241 
In October 2001, the United States, in conjunction with its allies in 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, began its attack on Afghanis-
tan, where the al Qaeda leadership was headquartered with the pro-
tection of the Taliban government.242 
This scenario is one in which the United States was attacked by a 
foreign power (if not a foreign nation); therefore, according to the 
Barbary framework, because the President has the power to “repel 
sudden attacks,”243 President George W. Bush had the constitutional 
authority to respond to this sudden attack and immediate threat to 
the nation.  Solely on the basis of this power being triggered, howev-
er, the President would only have the capacity to act defensively.  In 
the context of this attack, the President could have ordered opera-
tions against al Qaeda that would have protected American territory, 
interests, or civilians from further attacks without the approval of 
Congress.  Nonetheless, the President’s decision to attack Afghanis-
tan was entirely appropriate based on the Barbary framework because 
he obtained congressional consent to act offensively via the statutory 
language granting him the power to “use all necessary and appropri-
ate force” against the perpetrators of the attacks and the nations that 
harbored them.244  While President Bush had the ability to act defen-
sively because of the “sudden attack” on the nation, any significant 
limitation on his ability to act unilaterally disappeared when Congress 
granted him the authority to act offensively against al Qaeda. 
E.  The 2003 Invasion of Iraq:  Initiating Purely Offensive War 
The second of the Bush administration’s wars is more difficult to 
justify under the Barbary framework than the invasion of Afghanis-
tan.  The characteristics of the 2003 invasion of Iraq are distinguisha-
ble from every previous conflict that the United States entered with 
congressional authorization short of a declaration of war because the 
United States actually fired the first shot in the broader conflict with-
out a declaration of war.245  In September of 2002, members of the 
 
241 Id. at § 2(a). 
242 WILENTZ, supra note 163, at 434. 
243 See supra Part I. 
244 Authorization for Use of Military Force Pub. L. No. 107–40, 115 Stat. 224 § 2(a) (2001). 
245 As noted in Part IV.C, this situation is distinguishable from the Persian Gulf War because 
the United States did not initiate the broader conflict; rather, Iraq was the initial aggres-
sor with its August 1990 invasion of Kuwait. 
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Bush administration began announcing to the American public and 
the United Nations that Iraq had aided terrorist groups that had tar-
geted the United States and was developing weapons of mass destruc-
tion that could be used against the United States or provided to ter-
rorist groups.246  Congress passed the Authorization for Use of 
Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, authorizing the Presi-
dent “to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines 
to be necessary and appropriate” against Iraq.247  In March of 2003, an 
American-led force invaded Iraq, occupying the country by the be-
ginning of May.248  No weapons of mass destruction were ever 
found,249 and American troops remain in Iraq as of this writing. 
Unlike the Barbary Wars, or other undeclared wars discussed ear-
lier, the invasion of Iraq was not defensive in nature.  The attack was 
premised on the Bush administration’s policy of preemptive war, as 
laid out under the National Security Strategy of the United States, 
published in 2002.250  The policy of preemptive war asserts to be de-
fensive in nature, attempting to stop threats to the United States from 
other nations before they are able to attack.251  However, in a preemp-
tive war, the United States would still initiate the conflict because 
there would yet to be an attack on the United States by a foreign na-
tion.  The Constitution gives the power to “declare” war to Congress, 
and, as discussed previously, a crucial decision like beginning a war is 
an actual policy decision and was meant to be in the hands of the leg-
islative branch, not the executive.252  In other situations, where the 
United States or an ally is attacked, there is no policy decision to be 
made other than the means by which the President should use the 
military to defend the nation.  However, determining that the United 
States should attack another nation that has not attacked the United 
 
246 National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, for example, stated about Iraq’s intention to 
build and deploy weapons of mass destruction against the United States that “[w]e don’t 
want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.”  WILENTZ, supra note 163, at 443. 
247 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–
243, § 3, 116 Stat. 1498, 1501. 
248 See generally BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATTACK (2004) (describing the American invasion 
of Iraq). 
249 WILENTZ, supra note 163, at 445 (“[T]he invasion force had found no trace 
of . . . [weapons of mass destruction] in Iraq—the declared reason for the invasion.”). 
250 See generally THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2002), 
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nssintro.html 
(announcing a new American policy of preemptive war). 
251 See id. at 14 (“We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before 
they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States 
and our allies and friends.”) (emphasis added). 
252 See supra text accompanying notes 129–31. 
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States requires important weighing of facts, intelligence, and policy 
considerations.  Therefore, this decision belongs to Congress.  Both 
this article’s analytical framework and the explicit language of the 
Constitution support this conclusion.  Even if the President proclaims 
that the United States is acting in preemptive defense, the reality is 
that the United States is initiating the conflict, and Congress must 
make that decision.  This is especially apparent in light of the many 
unexpected difficulties in the occupation of Iraq and the violence 
that flared in the years after the invasion;253 these policy consequences 
were for Congress to consider, not the President, in the decision to 
invade Iraq. 
Arguably, Congress did make this decision; after all, it authorized 
the President to act offensively.  Some scholars would consider this 
sufficient for the President to subsequently begin an offensive war.254  
However, unlike such prior undeclared wars as the Barbary Wars, the 
Korean War, the Persian Gulf War, or the invasion of Afghanistan, 
the United States was not repelling any sort of attack on itself, its in-
terests, an ally, or even another nation.  Under this Article’s proposed 
framework, the United States initiating the use of offensive force 
must trigger the strongest possible action from Congress.  The Fra-
mers meant for the power to initiate war to be with Congress and laid 
out the action Congress must take in the Declare War Clause.255  
Where the decision is for the United States to initiate war, and espe-
cially when that war has an inherently offensive objective, Congress 
must be called upon to follow the instructions of the Constitution 
and issue a formal declaration of war.  Congress failed to live up to its 
responsibilities regarding the invasion of Iraq; therefore, the war in 
Iraq was not properly authorized by the Constitution.256 
The Iraq experience calls for Congress to more strongly assert its 
power under the Declare War Clause.  If the United States is to in-
itiate a war without provocation by an attack or a declaration of war 
 
253 WILENTZ, supra note 163, at 448–49 (describing the consequences of the invasion of 
Iraq). 
254 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terror-
ism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2128 (2005) (“[A] declaration of war is not required in order 
for Congress to authorize the President to fully prosecute a war; a broadly worded autho-
rization of force is sufficient.”). 
255 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (“The Congress shall have Power to . . . declare War, grant 
Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make rules concerning Captures on Land and Wa-
ter.”). 
256 See Gary Minda, Congressional Authorization and Deauthorization of War:  Lessons from the Viet-
nam War, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 943, 960 (2007) (“The 2002 AUMF was drafted by a Congress 
that was unwilling to make what the Constitution demands:  a straight out decision that 
the nation is at war.”). 
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by the other foreign power, such an offensive action must be accom-
panied by a declaration of war.  While a lesser authorization of offen-
sive action is acceptable when the President is acting inherently de-
fensively or in response to attack, undertaking purely offensive war 
should be accompanied by the strongest possible sanction by Con-
gress in the form of declaring war, a power specifically placed with 
Congress by the Constitution.257  As one early commentator noted, 
“every possible precaution should be used before a nation is plunged 
into [war].”258  If the United States is to initiate a conflict, such pre-
cautions should naturally include the Constitution’s directions for 
Congress to make the decision to commence the conflict.  Because of 
the importance of the decision itself, it is essential for Congress to ful-
ly debate and consider the strongest possible action.259  Taking this 
route would put Congress back in the role intended for it in initiating 
war.  If the President wishes to pursue a policy of initiating war, he 
must adhere to the Constitution and follow its guidelines by deferring 
to Congress and requesting a formal declaration of war. 
CONCLUSION 
Both the rhetoric and the actions of the Framers, exemplified 
during the Barbary Wars, reflect a distinct desire for Congress to play 
a central role in the decision to go to war.  This original understand-
ing of Congress’s role under the Constitution manifests itself by plac-
ing the power to initiate offensive war with Congress, not the Presi-
dent.  However, as undeclared war, whether offensive or defensive in 
nature, has become the norm, Congress has played less and less of a 
role in a decision in which it was supposed to be entrusted.  The most 
recent American experience in Iraq calls for Congress to reassert it-
self to the intended decision-making role in terms of the war power.260  
 
257 Id. 
258 WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 109 
(Philadelphia, Philip H. Nicklin, Law Bookseller, 2d ed. 1829). 
259 Louis Fisher supported this idea of the need for a full debate before authorizing the 
commencement of war, writing, “Only after Congress authorizes military action, reaching 
that decision through parliamentary deliberations, may the President as Commander in 
Chief order troops into combat.”  FISHER, supra note 10, at 267. 
260 At the time of this writing, there is a significant debate over whether President Obama 
acted in accordance with the Constitution in ordering the recent military intervention in 
Libya.  See Paul Richter & Christie Parsons, U.S. Role in Libya Brings Criticism for Obama, 
BALT. SUN, Mar. 22, 2011, at 1A (discussing the concerns of several members of Congress 
about the constitutionality of the bombing campaign in Libya); Charlie Savage, Attack Re-
news Debate Over Congressional Consent, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2011, at A14 (summarizing the 
debate over the constitutionality of President Obama’s decision to intervene militarily in 
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The crucial decision to initiate war, especially when the United States 
is unprovoked and commences a conflict itself, must be accompanied 
by the strongest congressional approval; namely, a declaration of war.  
Whenever a war takes an offensive character, the original understand-
ing of the Constitution has Congress as the key decision-making au-
thority.  Congress, as the branch empowered with policy-making au-
thority in terms of war powers, must therefore fulfill its responsibility 
to declare war if the United States wishes to initiate conflict, and give 
its approval if the President wishes to shift from defensive to offensive 
war.261 
 
Libya).  This article discusses many of the arguments currently being made regarding the 
constitutionality of the Libyan intervention, but a full analysis of its constitutionality 
would involve a review of not only the conflicts primarily discussed in this article but oth-
er limited military interventions short of full-scale ground invasions.  The Barbary Wars 
may provide useful background, but, unlike the Barbary Wars, the United States’s inter-
vention in Libya was not prompted by a Libyan attack on the United States or American 
commercial interests; instead, the United States allegedly intervened for the humanita-
rian purpose of protecting civilians.  See Scott Wilson, Obama:  U.S. Had Responsibility to 
Act, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2011, at A1 (discussing President Obama’s stated justifications 
for ordering the use of military force in Libya).  Accordingly, the most instructive histori-
cal precedent to review for an analysis of this most recent conflict may be the American 
participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s air campaign against Yugoslavia 
in 1999, which sought to halt human rights abuses against civilians in Kosovo.  Other apt 
sources of comparison may be American military involvement in Lebanon in the early 
1980s or in Somalia in the early 1990s.  Such an analysis is outside of the scope of this ar-
ticle, but the military action in Libya presents a new scenario that will likely require fur-
ther legal and historical analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
261 While not raising as much constitutional controversy as the decision to intervene in Libya, 
President Obama recently authorized a military operation in Pakistan that resulted in the 
death of al Qaeda’s leader, Osama bin Laden.  Bob Drogin, Ken Dilanian, & David Cloud, 
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U.S. Kills Bin Laden; Al Qaeda Leader Dies in a Firefight Near Pakistan Capital, L.A. TIMES, May 
2, 2011, at A1.  The proper role of Congress in approving overt or covert operations 
against non-state actors may ultimately become a more important constitutional issue 
than Congress’s role in authorizing conventional war between the United States and oth-
er nations, as the United States continues to undertake substantial operations around the 
globe in other countries against terrorist groups without the explicit approval of Con-
gress.  The United States undertook such operations long before the 2011 military opera-
tion targeting Osama bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan, including numerous drone 
strikes in Yemen and Pakistan, air strikes on terrorist targets in Somalia, and missile 
strikes against terrorist targets in Afghanistan and Sudan in response to al Qaeda attacks 
before September 11, 2001.  See Jeb Boone & Greg Miller, U.S. Conducts First Drone Strike in 
Yemen since ’02, WASH. POST., May 6, 2011, at A13 (discussing American drone strike 
against al Qaeda operatives in Yemen); David E. Sanger & Peter Baker, Obama Reorients 
Approach of National Security Strategy, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2010, at A8 (noting the Obama 
administration’s authorization of “increased C.I.A. drone strikes against militants in Pa-
kistan”); Jeffrey Gettleman, U.S. Strikes Inside Somalia, Bombing Suspected Militant Hide-Out, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2007 (late ed.), at 20; John Barry & Mark Dennis, The Best Laid Plans, 
NEWSWEEK, Sep. 7, 1998, at 43 (discussing American strikes in Sudan and Afghanistan in 
response to bombings of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania).  Congress did not 
provide authorization for these military operations, and, unlike in most conventional 
conflicts, would not have the opportunity to disapprove of or halt such operations 
through legislation or withdrawal of funding because of their limited nature and dura-
tion.  Legal scholars must assess the proper constitutional role of the legislative branch 
authorizing such actions as these types of military operations become more common and 
more important to effectively combating terrorism. 
 
